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ABSTRACT 
  This Article is the first to take a comprehensive look at the issue of 
statute-of-limitations accrual in method-of-execution cases. In other 
words, when does the clock start ticking on a death row inmate’s right 
to challenge the way in which the state intends to execute him?  Most 
circuit courts have held that method-of-execution challenges accrue at 
the completion of the direct appeal process. This means that death 
row inmates in these jurisdictions must file method-of-execution 
challenges years, and sometimes even decades, before an actual 
execution is scheduled.  Although this approach has been the subject 
of much criticism, even the dissenting view would tie the accrual date 
to a particular stage of the death row inmate’s appeals. 
  This Article examines whether either rule—the majority’s or the 
dissenters’—makes sense in light of the nature of method-of-execution 
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challenges and the purposes of statutes of limitations. It concludes 
that, rather than using the appellate and postconviction process as a 
guide in determining when an unrelated challenge to the state’s 
method of execution should accrue, courts should treat method-of-
execution claims as the unique tort claims that they are and should tie 
accrual to the future constitutional injury that has yet to occur. 
  The approach proposed in this Article would allow death row 
inmates with meritorious claims to have their days in court. And it is 
more faithful to the historical purposes of statutes of limitations, more 
practical to administer, and no less consistent with the desire 
expressed by many courts to preclude dilatory lawsuits. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Romell Broom is the only death row inmate in the United States 
to survive a state’s attempt to execute him by lethal injection. On 
September 15, 2009, Ohio prison officials spent more than two hours 
trying to access Broom’s veins, puncturing his skin at least eighteen 
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times.1 After unsuccessfully attempting to access a vein in Broom’s 
right ankle (and hitting his bone with the needles in the process),2 the 
Director of the Ohio Department of Corrections halted the execution 
and called the Governor.3 The Governor’s decision to postpone the 
execution received international attention because it was the first 
time an American lethal-injection execution attempt had been 
abandoned due to an inability to gain access to the condemned 
inmate’s veins.4 
What is less known about Broom’s case is that he had previously 
filed a § 19835 civil rights lawsuit challenging the way in which Ohio 
administered lethal injection, and he had specifically alleged that 
Ohio executioners were ill-equipped to achieve venous access.6 He 
sought injunctive relief enjoining the state from executing him until, 
among other things, the training of the execution team members was 
sufficient to remove the likelihood of vein-access difficulties.7 But 
Broom never had his day in court. Although he filed his lawsuit more 
than two years before the state attempted to execute him, it was 
dismissed for failing to comply with the statute of limitations.8 As a 
 
 1. Ariane de Vogue, Ohio Execution Fails After 18 Attempts to Puncture Inmate’s Veins, 
ABCNEWS.COM (Sept. 18, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/US/convicted-killer-romell-
broom-appeals-state-federal-court/story?id=8613608&page=1. 
 2. Affidavit of Romell Broom at 3, Broom v. Strickland, No. 2:09-cv-00823 (S.D. Ohio 
Sept. 18, 2009). 
 3. Governor Strickland Delays Ohio Execution of Romell Broom After Trouble Finding 
Suitable Vein, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 16, 2009, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/
2009/09/16/2009-09-16_governor_delays_ohio_execution_after_vein_troubles.html. 
 4. E.g., Elisabeth Semel, Reflections on Justice John Paul Stevens’s Concurring Opinion in 
Baze v. Rees: A Fifth Gregg Justice Renounces Capital Punishment, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 783, 
862–63 (2010) (“The Broom reprieve was not only unprecedented in Ohio, it was the first time 
in the [modern] era that authorities who had ‘botched’ an execution did not persist until they 
had succeeded.”); Giles Whittell, Lethal Injection for Killer Romell Broom Delayed After 
Botched Execution, TIMES (London), Sept. 16, 2009, at 36. 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “gives individuals a civil cause of action against any person who, under 
color of state law, deprives them of rights guaranteed by federal law or the Constitution.” Paul 
Rathburn, Note, Amending a Statute of Limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983: More Than “A Half 
Measure of Uniformity,” 73 MINN. L. REV. 85, 85 (1988). Put another way, § 1983 “provides the 
statutory authorization for most federal court suits against local governments or state and local 
government officials to redress violations of federal civil rights.” Beardslee v. Woodford, 395 
F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 6. Intervenor-Plaintiff’s Proposed Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, 
Attorney Fees, and Costs of Suit Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 at 11–12, 17, Broom v. Strickland, 
No. 2:04-cv-01156 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 2007). 
 7. Id. at 17. 
 8. Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey IV), No. 2:04-cv-1156, 2008 WL 4065809, at *5, *7 (S.D. 
Ohio Aug. 25, 2008). 
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result, he was subjected to the same faulty execution procedures that 
he had complained about in his lawsuit—and he lived to tell the tale. 
When is the right time to object to how you are going to die? For 
the thousands of men and women on death row in the United States, 
this question has taken on “exceptional importance,”9 but only 
recently so. For more than a century, death row inmates have 
challenged the method by which the state intends to execute them.10 
Only in the past several years, however, have courts begun to dismiss 
many of these challenges on statute-of-limitations grounds. They have 
done so by deciding a question that, for most courts, has been one of 
first impression: when does the statute of limitations begin to run on a 
constitutional violation that has not yet occurred? 
Without any real precedent to guide them, and over a number of 
vigorous dissents, most federal circuit courts have held that method-
of-execution challenges accrue at the completion of the direct appeal 
process.11 This means that death row inmates in these jurisdictions 
must file method-of-execution challenges years, and sometimes even 
decades, before an actual execution is scheduled. Some judges, 
writing either in dissent or at the district court level, have argued that 
the accrual date should be tied to the inmates’ appeals and 
postconviction processes; they would start running the statute of 
limitations at the completion of federal habeas corpus proceedings. 
This Article explores whether either rule makes sense given the 
nature of method-of-execution challenges and the purposes of 
statutes of limitations. 
The dominant approach to this issue has its roots in a March 
2007 decision of the Sixth Circuit. A divided panel of that court, in 
 
 9. Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey III), 489 F.3d 775, 776 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gilman, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 10. E.g., Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Court, 503 U.S. 653 (1992) (challenging the gas chamber as a 
method of execution); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (challenging electrocution as a 
method of execution); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879) (challenging the firing squad as a 
method of execution). In Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008), a plurality of the Supreme Court 
articulated what now appears to be the governing standard for establishing an Eighth 
Amendment violation in a method-of-execution challenge. Id. at 1532 (plurality opinion). 
Under Baze, the plaintiff must establish “both (1) that the current [execution] procedure poses 
‘a substantial risk of serious harm’ and (2) that the state has refused to adopt a ‘feasible, readily 
implemented’ alternative ‘significantly’ reducing that risk.” Eric Berger, Lethal Injection and the 
Problem of Constitutional Remedies, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 259, 274 (2009) (quoting Baze, 
128 S. Ct. at 1532 (plurality opinion)). 
 11. See infra Part I.A–B. 
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Cooey v. Strickland,12 was the first to wrestle with the appropriate 
accrual date for the statute of limitations in a § 1983 challenge to a 
method of execution.13 After considering a number of possible dates, 
the Cooey court decided that the most “attractive choice” for an 
accrual date was the date upon which the direct appeal process 
concluded in state court.14 
This approach consciously mirrors the accrual date found in the 
statute of limitations created by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),15 which governs federal habeas 
proceedings.16 The court in Cooey also held that when a state does not 
choose lethal injection as a method of execution until after the 
defendant’s direct review had concluded, the statute of limitations 
begins to run on the date the state adopted lethal injection or the date 
the state made lethal injection the sole method of execution.17 But 
when it is clear that lethal injection is the governing method of 
execution, most death row inmates, under the Cooey approach, must 
file constitutional challenges to the execution procedure relatively 
soon after their convictions and death sentences are affirmed on 
direct appeal. 
This Article explores whether there can ever be a functional 
accrual date in a method-of-execution challenge and concludes that 
there cannot. Such challenges are civil rights actions seeking to enjoin 
activity that has not yet occurred—the infliction of pain and suffering 
on a condemned inmate. Applying a statute of limitations to such a 
lawsuit, filed in advance of the anticipated injury, is not only 
conceptually nonsensical but also does little to vindicate the primary 
historical purpose of statutes of limitations: protecting defendants 
from having to defend against stale claims. A more doctrinally sound 
approach, and one that would avoid the counterproductive policy 
 
 12. Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2007). The Cooey line of cases 
spans four rulings, two in the Southern District of Ohio and two in the Sixth Circuit. For clarity, 
this Article simply refers to Cooey in general, but citations are provided to the appropriate 
rulings. 
 13. Id. at 416–24; see also Jones v. Allen, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1147 (M.D. Ala. 2007) 
(referring to Cooey as “the first and only published decision on when a method-of-execution 
claim brought under [§ 1983] accrues for statute-of-limitations purposes”). 
 14. Cooey II, 479 F.3d at 419. 
 15. AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of the U.S.C.); Cooey II, 479 F.3d at 422 (“[I]t stands to reason that the . . . most appropriate 
accrual date should mirror that found in the AEDPA . . . .”). 
 16. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
 17. Cooey II, 479 F.3d at 422. 
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implications of Cooey, would be one in which there is no functional 
accrual date for method-of-execution challenges. Under such an 
approach, inmates seeking to enjoin the use of certain execution 
procedures would have to meet the same stringent legal standards 
applied in other contexts in which plaintiffs seek injunctions, but 
would not have the added burden of overcoming a statute-of-
limitations defense. This Article advocates for courts to adopt such an 
approach. 
Part I examines the current state of the law. In the wake of a pair 
of Supreme Court decisions establishing the ability of death row 
inmates to file method-of-execution challenges as § 1983 civil rights 
actions, lower courts have seen a proliferation of such lawsuits.18 The 
states were somewhat slow to latch onto the statute-of-limitations 
defense as a mechanism for quick dismissal of these challenges, but it 
is now the rare case in which the defense is not raised. The Supreme 
Court has never addressed when the statute of limitations accrues on 
a method-of-execution challenge, but several circuit courts have now 
taken a position. Although Cooey is the seminal case thus far and has 
been adopted by other circuits, a number of dissenting circuit judges 
and district court judges have taken exception to its reasoning. Most 
of these dissenters would set the accrual date at a different step in the 
appellate and postconviction process: the conclusion of federal 
habeas proceedings. 
Part II discusses why it is a mistake for courts to import AEDPA 
rules, as well as the motivations behind those rules, when determining 
the accrual date for method-of-execution challenges. The Supreme 
Court has made clear that § 1983 method-of-execution lawsuits are 
not challenges to inmates’ convictions or sentences.19 The concerns 
that led to the passage of AEDPA are therefore not implicated in 
such lawsuits, and the use of that statute as a guideline arbitrarily 
removes the ability of most death row inmates to challenge the means 
by which the state will execute them. The selection of any accrual 
date that is tied to the appellate or postconviction process, in fact, 
divorces the filing rules from the primary purpose of statutes of 
limitations, which is to provide repose to defendants.20 Such statutes 
 
 18. See sources cited infra note 30. 
 19. See Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 576 (2006); Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 
641–42 (2004). Hill and Nelson are discussed in greater detail later in this Article. See infra text 
accompanying notes 27–31, 63–72 & 127–39. 
 20. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (“[Statutes of limitations] are 
statutes of repose; and although affording plaintiffs what the legislature deems a reasonable 
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“represent a pervasive legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to 
put the adversary on notice to defend within a specified period of 
time and that ‘the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to 
prevail over the right to prosecute them.’”21 Nothing about a method-
of-execution claim implicates concerns of staleness, forgetful 
witnesses, or missing evidence, however, because the constitutional 
tort has not yet taken place. 
Part III discusses the way in which most courts to address this 
issue have improperly conflated statute-of-limitations and equitable 
concerns. Equitable concerns—that death row inmates are filing 
lethal-injection challenges merely to forestall their impending 
executions—animate most of the recent statute-of-limitations 
jurisprudence. Part III explains why equitable concerns should play 
no role in a statute-of-limitations analysis. Equity will take care of the 
truly dilatory lethal-injection challenges. But when death row inmates 
have good reason to have waited to file a lethal-injection challenge—
because, for example, improprieties in the state’s administration of 
the protocol only recently came to light—and when they can 
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, they should be 
permitted to proceed with a constitutional challenge. The approach 
taken by most courts so far has not only foreclosed that option, but 
has also created an unnecessarily confusing regime that wastes 
judicial resources and does little to ensure the finality and certainty 
that it was intended to produce. 
Finally, Part IV argues that tying the accrual date to any step in 
the appeals or postconviction process is a flawed approach. Rather, 
the statute of limitations should start running on the date the 
unconstitutional execution occurs. Because the condemned inmate 
cannot wait that long to file suit, as a practical matter there is no 
functional accrual date for a method-of-execution challenge. This 
approach makes the most sense doctrinally, and it avoids the arbitrary 
and confusing line drawing of the other approaches. It also takes into 
account the nature of lethal-injection challenges, which have far more 
to do with the record of past executions and the current plans to 
administer lethal injection than with the simple availability of a 
 
time to present their claims, they protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with 
cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by 
death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or 
otherwise.”). 
 21. Id. (quoting R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)). 
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written protocol. In other words, these tend to be fact-bound cases in 
which the evidentiary record is continuously developing; they do not 
tend to present, for example, abstract questions of statutory 
interpretation dependent on a factual record that is static and can be 
fixed in time. The approach advocated here protects inmates who 
could not have brought their challenges earlier and does nothing to 
inhibit the ability of courts to dismiss on equitable grounds challenges 
that have been brought solely for the purpose of delay. 
Cooey and its progeny are explicitly concerned that death row 
inmates—and, by implicit extension, their attorneys—are using 
method-of-execution challenges as last-ditch efforts to forestall 
executions that are otherwise judicially unimpeded.22 This Article 
demonstrates that it is not necessary to distort the doctrine of statute 
of limitations, as these courts have done, to ensure that states have 
the ability to enforce their death-penalty judgments. Indeed, even if it 
were accurate to characterize most method-of-execution challenges as 
frivolous lawsuits filed solely for the purposes of delay, that would not 
justify distorting the doctrine in a way that precludes meritorious 
claims from being heard. And most such claims are not frivolous at 
all. Counsel for death row inmates must—and will—file method-of-
execution challenges whenever and however it is ethical to do so and 
is in their clients’ interests.23 Many of these claims have been 
unsuccessful, but many others have exposed serious problems in the 
administration of lethal injection in this country.24 The approach 
advocated in this Article permits death row inmates to file objections 
to the manner and means by which the state intends to execute them, 
so long as they are not filed solely for the purpose of delaying the 
execution. It also achieves the stated goals of the courts that are 
concerned with dilatory filings but does so without distorting the 
statute-of-limitations doctrine. 
 
 22. See infra Part III.A. 
 23. See Ty Alper, The Truth About Physician Participation in Lethal Injection Executions, 
88 N.C. L. REV. 11, 66 (2009) (“[L]awyers must continue to vindicate their clients’ rights, 
including the Eighth Amendment right not to be subjected to an execution procedure that is 
likely to involve excruciating pain and suffering.”). 
 24. See infra notes 29 & 43. 
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I.  THE STATE OF THE LAW 
Death row inmates have been filing method-of-execution 
challenges for more than a century.25 But only relatively recently have 
they used § 1983 as the vehicle for doing so.26 Once the Supreme 
Court established in Nelson v. Campbell27 and Hill v. McDonough28 
that § 1983 is an appropriate vehicle for bringing method-of-
execution challenges, and once litigation in several states began to 
uncover “numerous flaws in states’ lethal injection procedures,”29 
courts began to see a proliferation of such challenges.30 As Deborah 
Denno has written, “Challenges to lethal injection protocols existed 
years before Nelson and Hill, but the Court’s spark of encouragement 
[in those cases], no matter how indirect, propelled attorneys to bring 
claims that may have remained dormant otherwise.”31 
Because § 1983 was not the preferred method for bringing 
method-of-execution challenges prior to Hill and Nelson,32 courts did 
 
 25. See Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 IOWA L. 
REV. 319, 333–39 (1997) (describing the history of method-of-execution challenges); see also 
Richard C. Dieter, Methods of Execution and Their Effect on the Use of the Death Penalty in the 
United States, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 789, 792–95 (2008) (discussing various method-of-
execution challenges). 
 26. See Denno, supra note 25, at 342–43 (noting that death row inmates began filing 
method-of-execution challenges as § 1983 cases in the mid-1990s). 
 27. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004). 
 28. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (2006). 
 29. Berger, supra note 10, at 263–64, 268–72 (discussing various flaws, including that the 
procedure “create[s] an unnecessary risk of pain,” that the state “use[s] . . . untrained and 
unqualified personnel,” that the architecture of the execution chambers prevents executions 
from being carried out in a safe, efficient manner, and that “some states have failed to adopt 
consistent, predictable procedures, leading to inconsistent behavior and recordkeeping”). 
 30. See Note, A New Test for Evaluating Eighth Amendment Challenges to Lethal 
Injections, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1301, 1301 (2007) (referring to an “explosion” of lethal-injection 
challenges filed as § 1983 lawsuits following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hill); Liam J. 
Montgomery, Note, The Unrealized Promise of Section 1983 Method-of-Execution Challenges, 
94 VA. L. REV. 1987, 1989–90 (2008) (noting that, prior to Hill, “[b]ecause courts largely viewed 
method-of-execution challenges as [habeas challenges], Section 1983 played little role in capital 
post-conviction litigation”); Daniel R. Oldenkamp, Note, Civil Rights in the Execution Chamber: 
Why Death Row Inmates’ Section 1983 Claims Demand Reassessment of Legitimate Penological 
Objectives, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 955, 988 (2008) (noting that Hill “mobilized death row inmates 
nationwide to test the [§ 1983] avenue for relief”). 
 31. Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled 
the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 107 (2007) (footnote omitted). 
 32. Before Hill and Nelson, method-of-execution challenges were typically brought in 
habeas petitions. See Montgomery, supra note 30, at 1995–96 (“Before [Nelson] was decided in 
2004, it was generally accepted that federal method-of-execution claims were cognizable only 
through a habeas corpus petition.”). 
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not have occasion to address the statute-of-limitations issue until 
§ 1983 lawsuits became more common. Even then, however, states 
were slow to raise the statute of limitations as a defense.33 Until the 
Sixth Circuit accepted Ohio’s statute-of-limitations defense in Cooey, 
the issue was not even litigated in some of the most prominent lethal-
injection cases.34 Perhaps it had never before occurred to states’ 
lawyers to raise a statute-of-limitations defense to an action seeking 
to enjoin activity that had not yet occurred. In any event, now that 
courts have begun to adopt the Cooey approach, states’ lawyers, 
seeking to take advantage of an expeditious method of getting cases 
dismissed, routinely raise the defense in lethal-injection challenges.35 
Before examining the state of the law with respect to the accrual 
issue, it is important to clarify the nature of most § 1983 challenges to 
state lethal-injection practices.36 States that employ lethal injection, 
with the exceptions of Ohio and Washington, use a three-drug 
formula to carry out executions.37 The first drug is intended to 
anesthetize the inmate; the second to paralyze him; and the third drug 
to stop his heart, killing him.38 Many of the § 1983 lawsuits filed in 
recent years on behalf of death row inmates allege that states do not 
employ adequate safeguards to ensure that the person being executed 
is properly anesthetized before the second and third drugs are 
 
 33. For example, the issue was never litigated in Taylor v. Crawford, 445 F.3d 1095 (8th 
Cir. 2006), the lethal-injection litigation in Missouri that served as one of the catalysts for 
serious questioning of lethal-injection practices around the country. Nooner v. Norris, 491 F.3d 
804, 810 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he issue of unjustified delay by the inmate was not raised or 
litigated in Taylor.”); see also Berger, supra note 10, at 268–70 (discussing revelations about 
lethal-injection practices in Missouri that were discovered during the Taylor litigation). 
 34. For a history of lethal-injection challenges, see sources cited supra note 25. 
 35. See infra text accompanying notes 86–97. 
 36. Although § 1983 can be used to challenge any method of execution, this Article focuses 
almost exclusively on challenges to lethal injection, the dominant method of execution in the 
vast majority of death penalty states. Denno, supra note 31, at 59. The legal analysis discussed 
herein would be similar if not identical in the context of a challenge to another method of 
execution, such as electrocution, but this Article uses “method-of-execution challenge” and 
“lethal-injection challenge” interchangeably for simplicity’s sake. 
 37. Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind 
State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 
97 (2002). Ohio announced in 2009 that it had abandoned the three-drug formula in favor of a 
one-drug, anesthetic-only alternative. Ian Urbina, Ohio Is First to Change to One Drug in 
Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at A10. The State of Washington adopted Ohio’s 
approach in March 2010. Rachel La Corte, WA Changes Execution Method, ABCNEWS.COM, 
Mar. 3, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=9992489. 
 38. Denno, supra note 37, at 97–98. 
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administered.39 Because the second drug in the formula paralyzes the 
inmate, the concern is that an inadequately anesthetized person “may 
have the sensation of paralysis without anesthesia (known as 
awareness) and may feel the burning of the highly concentrated 
potassium chloride.”40 If this were to happen, the inmate “could lie 
paralyzed, suffocating and experiencing intense burning in his veins, 
and yet appear peaceful.”41 
Because there is no dispute that, if implemented properly, the 
three-drug formula will result in a constitutional execution,42 the 
primary challenges to lethal injection are tied to the implementation 
of the protocol and the specific personnel involved rather than to the 
drugs used in the procedure.43 As Professor Eric Berger has put it, 
“Probably the most serious and complicated problem with many 
states’ lethal injection procedures is the use of untrained and 
unqualified personnel.”44 Some challenges do implicate the design of 
the protocol and the drugs, but for the most part they rely on 
evidence of maladministration of those drugs in order to establish a 
“substantial risk”45 that the execution will result in an unconstitutional 
level of pain to the condemned inmate. The factors that create the 
risk—such as inadequate equipment, poor training, and unqualified 
execution personnel—are based on aspects of the procedure that are 
subject to constant revision and are therefore inherently malleable.46 
 
 39. Berger, supra note 10, at 265; Denno, supra note 31, at 54–58. 
 40. David Waisel, Physician Participation in Capital Punishment, 82 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 
1073, 1074 (2007). 
 41. Berger, supra note 10, at 265; see also Ty Alper, Anesthetizing the Public Conscience: 
Lethal Injection and Animal Euthanasia, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 817, 819 (2008) (“Because 
pancuronium paralyzes the inmate during the execution process, the inmate may experience 
excruciating pain and suffering but be unable to cry out or even blink an eyelid to let anyone 
know if the anesthesia has failed.” (citing Waisel, supra note 40, at 1074)). 
 42. See, e.g., Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 978 (N.D. Ca. 2006) (“The parties . . . 
agree . . . that assuming effective anesthesia, the use in executions of pancuronium bromide or 
potassium chloride as such does not violate the Eighth Amendment.”). 
 43. E.g., Alper, supra note 41, at 820 (“Litigation on behalf of death row inmates has 
exposed problems at every step of the process, including the mixing of the drugs; the setting of 
the IV lines; the administration of the drugs; and the monitoring of their effectiveness.”); 
Berger, supra note 10, at 268 (describing some noted deficiencies in the implementation of 
lethal injections). 
 44. Berger, supra note 10, at 268. 
 45. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1532 (2008) (plurality opinion). 
 46. See, e.g., McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1178 (11th Cir. 2008) (Wilson, J., dissenting) 
(“Callahan’s § 1983 action is not based on the fact of his death sentence or even on the fact that 
he is to be executed by lethal injection. Rather, Callahan is asserting that the specific lethal 
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For example, in 2006, a federal judge held that the record before 
him was “replete with evidence that in actual practice [California’s 
written lethal-injection protocol] does not function as intended.”47 
The state’s “implementation of lethal injection is broken,” he wrote, 
“but it can be fixed.”48 In other cases, the states themselves have 
emphasized that changes to the personnel and implementation 
procedures, even with no accompanying changes to the written 
protocol or the drugs used, can seriously affect the plaintiff’s 
entitlement to relief.49 More recently, questions have surfaced about 
the availability of sodium thiopental, the drug that most states use to 
anesthetize the prisoner before paralyzing him and injecting him with 
deadly potassium chloride.50 The sole U.S. manufacturer of sodium 
thiopental has temporarily stopped production, leaving states 
scrambling to use stockpiles of the drug before they expire51 or 
acquire the drug from foreign sources not approved by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA).52 In light of the manufacturing 
stoppage, questions abound about the integrity of thiopental used in 
recent executions and where it was obtained.53 These questions have 
little, if anything, to do with the states’ written lethal-injection 
 
injection protocol presently employed by Alabama is likely to cause him undue pain and 
suffering when his execution is carried out.”). 
 47. Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 979. 
 48. Id. at 974. 
 49. For example, in Arizona and Missouri, prison officials changed protocols after issues 
arose with doctors who were involved in executions. See, e.g., Alper, supra note 23, at 46–47. In 
Missouri, litigation revealed that Dr. Alan Doerhoff, who had been responsible for “virtually all 
aspects of executions,” was unqualified and incompetent to perform the executions. Id. at 46. 
This was a change in the personnel that was entirely at the states’ discretion, and it had the 
potential to fundamentally affect the plaintiffs’ claim for relief. 
 50. See Kathy Lohr, States Delay Executions Owing to Drug Shortage, NPR (Sept. 16, 
2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129912444 (reporting on delays in 
executions due to shortages of sodium thiopental). 
 51. See Kevin Fagan, Execution: Expiration Date Near for Death Drug,  
S.F. CHRON., Sept. 29, 2010, http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-09-29/news/24102111_1_sodium-
thiopental-pancuronium-bromide-fatal-drugs (“[N]ever before has the state faced a problem 
such as the one confronting officials intending to lethally inject a rapist-murderer Thursday—
the expiration, on that same night, of one of the fatal drugs.”). 
 52. See Amanda Lee Myers & Andrew Welsh-Huggins, State Goes Overseas for Lethal 
Injection Drug, YAHOO! NEWS, Oct. 26, 2010, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20101026/ap_on_re_
us/us_arizona_execution (“Facing a nationwide shortage of a lethal injection drug, Arizona has 
taken an unusual step that other death penalty states may soon follow: get their supplies from 
another country.”). 
 53. See Lohr, supra note 50 (noting “concerns about this haphazard method of 
implementing the ultimate punishment”). 
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protocols, yet they are critical to an understanding of how the states 
intend to carry out those protocols. 
In short, § 1983 challenges to lethal injection revolve around the 
current plans to implement the state’s written protocols. With that in 
mind, this Part now turns to the state of the law with respect to when 
the statute of limitations begins running on such challenges. Because 
§ 1983 cases are generally characterized as constitutional tort claims, 
federal courts borrow the length of the state statute of limitations for 
personal injury actions,54 which is typically one to three years.55 But 
the accrual date—that is, when the statute of limitations begins to 
run—is a question of federal law.56 Establishing the accrual date in a 
method-of-execution challenge is a matter of first impression in most 
jurisdictions. Cooey was the first published decision to address the 
accrual date of a method-of-execution challenge. A bit of history is in 
order, as this case has set the tone for all courts that have 
subsequently examined the issue. 
A. Cooey v. Strickland 
In 1997, on the eve of his scheduled execution, a Kentucky death 
row inmate named Harold McQueen filed a § 1983 civil action in 
federal court alleging that the state’s then-used method of 
execution—electrocution—violated the Eighth Amendment.57 The 
Sixth Circuit faulted McQueen for filing the challenge as a civil 
action, characterizing the complaint as “a challenge seeking to 
interfere with the sentence itself.”58 As such, the court construed the 
complaint as a petition for habeas and dismissed it for failure to 
comply with the rules for filing such petitions.59 
 
 54. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985) (“When Congress has not established a 
time limitation for a federal cause of action, the settled practice has been to adopt a local time 
limitation as federal law . . . .”); see also Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1989) (“[W]here 
state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, courts considering 
§ 1983 claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions.”). 
 55. See Michael B. Brennan, Note, Okure v. Owens: Choosing Among Personal Injury 
Statutes of Limitations for Section 1983, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 1306, 1324–25 (1988) (discussing how 
different circuits have applied different state statutes of limitations). 
 56. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). Defendants have the burden of 
demonstrating that the statute of limitations has run. See, e.g., Griffin v. Rogers, 308 F.3d 647, 
653 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 57. McQueen v. Patton (In re Sapp), 118 F.3d 460, 461 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 58. Id. at 462. 
 59. Id. at 463. 
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Six years later, an Ohio death row inmate named Lewis Williams 
filed a similar civil action in federal court challenging Ohio’s lethal-
injection procedures.60 Relying on the precedent from McQueen’s 
case, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Williams’s lawsuit on 
the grounds that § 1983 was not the appropriate vehicle for 
challenging a method of execution.61 Both McQueen and Williams 
were executed soon after the Sixth Circuit dismissed their respective 
cases.62 
In 2004, however, the Supreme Court decided Nelson v. 
Campbell, which held for the first time that § 1983 is an appropriate 
vehicle for challenging a state’s method of execution.63 The Court 
reasoned that, because the challenge was not to the constitutionality 
of the conviction or sentence but rather to the manner and means by 
which the state intended to carry out the sentence, the case was more 
akin to a prison-conditions lawsuit than a collateral attack on the 
constitutionality of the trial.64 
Richard Cooey, another Ohio death row inmate, filed a lethal-
injection challenge immediately following the Nelson ruling. Cooey 
had been sentenced to death in 1986, and his postconviction appeals 
were finally denied in March 2003.65 Cooey filed his lethal-injection 
challenge under § 1983, as the Supreme Court had deemed 
appropriate just two weeks earlier in Nelson. The state sought to 
dismiss Cooey’s lethal-injection challenge—not because it was filed as 
a § 1983 case, but because it was filed after the statute of limitations 
had run.66 The state argued that the two-year statute of limitations for 
constitutional torts accrued either in 1993, when Ohio adopted lethal 
 
 60. In re Williams, 359 F.3d 811 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 61. Id. at 813–14 (citing In re Sapp, 118 F.3d at 464). 
 62. See Execution Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/
executions (last visited Nov. 19, 2010) (providing a database of executions carried out in the 
United States). Lewis Williams’s case was dismissed on January 14, 2004, and he was executed 
two days later. Harold McQueen was executed on July 1, 1997, just days after the Sixth Circuit 
dismissed his appeal on June 27, 1997. 
 63. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 641–42 (2004). 
 64. Id. at 645; see also Beardslee v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 1064, 1068–69 (“[Petitioner’s] claim 
is more properly considered as a ‘conditions of confinement’ challenge, which is cognizable 
under § 1983, than as a challenge that would implicate the legality of his sentence, and thus be 
appropriate for federal habeas review.”). 
 65. Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey I), No. 2:04 CV 1156, 2005 WL 5253337, at *2 (S.D. Ohio 
Mar. 28, 2005). 
 66. Id. 
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injection as a method of execution, or in 2001, when lethal injection 
became the sole method of execution in the state.67 
The district court rejected the state’s statute-of-limitations 
defense, holding that the lethal-injection challenge accrued both 
when Cooey’s execution became imminent—that is, when his direct 
and postconviction appeals had been exhausted—and when he had 
reason to know of the facts that gave rise to his specific method-of-
execution challenge.68 The district court wrote that requiring a death 
row inmate to file a method-of-execution challenge any sooner 
“strikes this Court as potentially wasteful and possibly absurd,” given 
that he may win relief on appeal or see the execution protocols 
changed during the lengthy appeals process.69 The district court also 
questioned how Cooey could have been required to file a § 1983 
lawsuit prior to Nelson, when circuit precedent squarely held that 
such lawsuits were improper.70 
The Sixth Circuit reversed. The court acknowledged that clear 
Sixth Circuit precedent had “precluded” a death row inmate from 
filing a § 1983 action challenging his method of execution until the 
Supreme Court decided Nelson, and it acknowledged that Cooey had 
filed his lawsuit only weeks after Nelson was decided.71 Nevertheless, 
the court reasoned, Cooey could have filed a § 1983 lawsuit earlier, 
anticipating either that the Sixth Circuit would revisit the issue en 
banc or that the Supreme Court would overrule circuit precedent. 
After all, the court noted, nothing stopped Lewis Williams from filing 
a § 1983 lawsuit in Ohio even though the precedent from Harold 
McQueen’s case six years earlier foreclosed such an avenue of relief.72 
The Sixth Circuit’s primary justification for rejecting the district 
court’s accrual-date test was that it “adds a significant period of delay 
to a state’s ability to exercise its sovereign power and to finalize its 
 
 67. Id. at *3. 
 68. Id. at *7. 
 69. Id. at *5. 
 70. Id. at *4. 
 71. Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 422 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 72. Id. As the dissent in Cooey pointed out, Williams’s lawsuit was unsuccessful—his suit 
was dismissed, his petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court was denied, and he was executed. 
Id. at 426 (Gilman, J., dissenting). Holding Williams out as an example for what Cooey should 
have done is arguably disingenuous. The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Cooey on this point, 
however, was echoed by the Eleventh Circuit in Grayson v. Allen, 491 F.3d 1318, 1322–23 (11th 
Cir. 2007). In Grayson, the court held that a death row inmate could have filed a § 1983 lawsuit 
challenging lethal injection prior to Hill despite the fact that Eleventh Circuit precedent on 
point precluded such a lawsuit. Id. 
ALPER IN FINAL.DOC 1/5/2011  5:04:31 PM 
880 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:865 
judgments.”73 Allowing death row inmates to file method-of-
execution challenges after they have gone through lengthy appeals 
and habeas proceedings, the court explained, threatens to frustrate 
the states’ ability to enforce their laws.74 The court recalled that 
Congress passed AEDPA in response to the same concern and to 
“restore and maintain the proper balance between state criminal 
adjudications and federal collateral proceedings.”75 Stating that “[a]ll 
of the same concerns . . . reflected in . . . AEDPA are relevant here,” 
the Sixth Circuit in Cooey chose to borrow AEDPA’s statute-of-
limitations accrual date.76 Under AEDPA, the one-year statute of 
limitations for filing a federal habeas petition begins to run at the 
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such 
review.77 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit held that a death row inmate’s 
statute of limitations for filing a method-of-execution challenge 
generally would accrue at that same time.78 
The only exception to AEDPA’s accrual-date formula, according 
to Cooey, would be a situation in which a prisoner did not know what 
the method of execution would be when the statute of limitations 
would otherwise accrue.79 In that case, the statute of limitations would 
accrue when it became clear what that method would be. For 
example, Ohio did not adopt lethal injection until 1993 or make it the 
exclusive method of execution until 2001.80 One of those dates would 
mark the accrual date for Cooey, the court reasoned, because his 
direct appeal was completed in 1991. Because his 2004 complaint 
would have been filed late under either a 1993 or a 2001 accrual date, 
the court did not need to decide which would have been the 
 
 73. Cooey II, 479 F.3d at 419. 
 74. See id. at 419 (emphasizing the importance of permitting states to bring finality to the 
process). 
 75. Id. at 420. 
 76. Id. at 422. 
 77. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
 78. Cooey II, 479 F.3d at 422. It is worth noting that under AEDPA the statute of 
limitations is tolled during the pendency of often very lengthy state postconviction proceedings. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (“The time during which a properly filed application for State post-
conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending 
shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.”). The Cooey 
approach to the statute of limitations in the method-of-execution context includes no such 
tolling mechanism, nor does the court seem to have contemplated the possibility of equitable 
tolling. See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010) (holding that AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations may be tolled for equitable reasons). 
 79. Cooey II, 479 F.3d at 422. 
 80. Id. 
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appropriate accrual date.81 Unable to obtain review of the state’s 
lethal-injection procedures, Cooey was executed by lethal injection 
on October 14, 2008.82 
In an era in which lawyers for death row inmates are often 
criticized for filing appeals and claims that are allegedly frivolous,83 it 
is odd that Cooey was faulted for not filing a lawsuit that was 
precluded by binding circuit precedent.84 But the Sixth Circuit’s 
opinion in Cooey stands for more than just the particularly harsh 
application of procedural rules in a death penalty case. After all, now 
that Nelson is the law of the land, there is no longer any question that 
§ 1983 is the appropriate forum for raising a challenge to a state’s 
method of execution.85 Death row inmates, going forward, know how 
to file a challenge, so there should be no confusion over whether 
§ 1983 or habeas is the appropriate vehicle. But do they know when 
to do so? Most courts have followed Cooey’s lead, setting an accrual 
date years in advance of the inmate’s execution. 
B. Cooey’s Progeny 
More than 60 percent of executions since 2000 have taken place 
in the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits.86 It is the states in these 
circuits that primarily comprise the modern administration of capital 
 
 81. See id. (holding that Cooey’s § 1983 action was barred by the statute of limitations 
without noting when the statute began to run). 
 82. Execution Database, supra note 62. 
 83. See, e.g., Dorothy Nash Holmes, Habeas Corpus or Hocus Pocus, 8 NEV. LAW. 28, 28 
(2000) (criticizing the delay in postconviction litigation); Franco Ordoñez, Death Row Appeal 
Challenges Rule Limiting Filings, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 17, 2004, at A1 (referring to the 
complaint of death penalty supporters that defense attorneys “[tie] up the court system with 
frivolous claims”); Jim Vertuno, Few Appeals Follow Execution Ruling, HOUS. CHRON., July 21, 
2002, at 43A (“[C]ritics continue to warn about frivolous appeals that would drain time and 
money from the court system.”). 
 84. See, e.g., Rutherford v. McDonough, 466 F.3d 970, 979 (11th Cir. 2006) (Wilson, J., 
dissenting) (noting that “there would have been little point” to death row inmates bringing a 
§ 1983 method-of-execution challenge in the Eleventh Circuit prior to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hill). 
 85. See Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 576 (2006) (reiterating the Nelson rule). It 
remains an open question whether method-of-execution challenges must be brought as § 1983 
challenges. See, e.g., Duty v. Workman, No. 07-7073, 2010 WL 533117, at *11 (10th Cir. Feb. 12, 
2010) (“Neither the Supreme Court nor this Circuit has definitively resolved whether claims 
challenging the specific method of execution may never be considered in a habeas 
proceeding.”). 
 86. Execution Database, supra note 62. 
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punishment in this country.87 Not surprisingly, then, it is the courts in 
these circuits that have had occasion, in the wake of the increase in 
§ 1983 method-of-execution challenges, to rule on the statute-of-
limitations accrual-date issue. When they have done so, they have 
followed Cooey. Both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have, in large 
part, adopted Cooey’s approach, as has one other federal court. 
In McNair v. Allen,88 an Alabama case, the Eleventh Circuit 
acknowledged that the question of when the statute of limitations 
accrues in a method-of-execution challenge was novel in that circuit,89 
presumably because no state in the circuit had ever before raised 
statute of limitations as a defense in such a case. Instead, the court 
noted, it had traditionally employed an equitable analysis to 
determine whether method-of-execution challenges were filed in a 
timely manner.90 Now that Alabama had raised the statute of 
limitations as a threshold defense, the court was in a position to 
address the question of first impression. 
Relying in large part on the reasoning of Cooey, the Eleventh 
Circuit rejected several possible accrual dates before concluding that 
the completion of review on direct appeal will “ordinarily” trigger the 
statute of limitations in a method-of-execution challenge.91 When, as 
in McNair, the petitioner did not choose his method of execution 
under Alabama law until after his direct appeal had been concluded, 
the statute of limitations began running on the date that he chose his 
method of execution.92 In sum, the standard for determining the 
accrual date in the Eleventh Circuit looks very similar to that in 
 
 87. Except for Ohio, the states in these circuits are all in the southern United States. See 
Franklin E. Zimring, The Wages of Ambivalence: On the Context and Prospects of New York’s 
Death Penalty, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 303, 307 (1996) (“The outstanding regional characteristic of 
executions in the 1990s is Southern dominance. The consistent tradition of heavy concentration 
of executions in the South extends well back into American history.”); Lawrence Kilman, Are 
Southern States More Likely to Execute Killers?, GAINESVILLE SUN (Fla.), Jan. 29, 1985, at 8A 
(“Studies show the South has a historical tradition of executing more people than the rest of the 
country, and some experts say a ‘tradition of retribution’ may also contribute to the execution 
rate there.”); Ned Walpin, Why Is Texas #1 in Executions, PBS (Dec. 5, 2000), http://www.
pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/execution/readings/texas.html. 
 88. McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 89. Id. at 1172. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1176. 
 92. Id. at 1177. When the Alabama legislature changed the state’s preferred method of 
execution to lethal injection in 2002, inmates were given thirty days to choose whether they 
wanted to die by electrocution or lethal injection. Those that did not make a choice were 
deemed to have chosen lethal injection. Id. 
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Cooey—in the Eleventh Circuit’s words, “the later of the date on 
which state review is complete, or the date on which the capital 
litigant becomes subject to a new or substantially changed execution 
protocol.”93 
The Fifth Circuit in Walker v. Epps94 followed both Cooey and 
McNair, holding that the accrual date for a method-of-execution 
challenge was “the later of two dates: the date direct review of an 
individual case is complete or the date on which the challenged 
[execution] protocol was adopted.”95 Likewise, the District Court for 
the District of Columbia, in Roane v. Holder,96 held that a method-of-
execution claim accrues “upon completion of the plaintiff’s direct 
appeal or, if the challenged protocol is not known upon conclusion of 
direct appeal, at the time the plaintiff ‘knew or should have known 
based upon reasonable inquiry’ about the protocol giving rise to the 
challenge.”97 
In sum, the precedent on this issue is largely uniform. If the 
challenged execution protocol exists and is applicable to the death 
row inmate, the statute of limitations begins to run when direct 
review is completed. If the protocol is not adopted or made available 
at that point, or it does not apply to the inmate at the time direct 
review is completed, the statute of limitations begins to run when the 
protocol is adopted, is made available, and is applicable to the inmate. 
C. Dissenting Judges and Jones v. Allen 
Uniformity, however, does not preclude controversy. The Cooey 
approach has been met by a drumbeat of criticism from dissenting 
circuit court judges and district court judges. The critics of Cooey fall 
into two camps. Most argue that Cooey sets the accrual date too early; 
a minority argues there should be no functional accrual date at all. 
Thus far, the dissenting circuit court judges fall into the first 
camp. For example, Judge Ronald Gilman, dissenting in Cooey, 
agreed with the district court in that case and would have set the 
accrual date “at the time when a prisoner’s execution becomes 
imminent and the prisoner knows or has reason to know of the facts 
 
 93. Id. at 1174. Courts thus far have employed a narrow definition of what it means for a 
state to “substantially change” an execution protocol. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 94. Walker v. Epps, 550 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 95. Id. at 414. 
 96. Roane v. Holder, 607 F. Supp. 2d 216 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 97. Id. at 221 (quoting Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 422 (6th Cir. 2007)). 
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giving rise to his § 1983 claim.”98 In the context of a challenge to lethal 
injection, Judge Gilman would have held that a prisoner knows or has 
reason to know of the facts giving rise to his claim “when he learns 
the details of the protocol that will be used for his execution.”99 As for 
when the execution becomes imminent, Judge Gilman would define 
that point as the completion of federal habeas proceedings, which 
“have become, for good or for ill, a routine part of carrying out a 
death sentence in our criminal justice system.”100 When Cooey went 
up for an en banc vote, five other Sixth Circuit judges joined Judge 
Gilman in dissenting from the court’s denial of rehearing en banc.101 
In a subsequent Sixth Circuit case that relied on Cooey, several 
judges wrote stinging opinions criticizing the Cooey rationale and 
citing with approval Judge Gilman’s dissent. Judge Karen Moore 
wrote that the court had “fundamentally erred” in its approach to 
setting the accrual date.102 Dissenting circuit court judges in other 
circuits have also agreed with Judge Gilman’s proposed approach. 
For example, Judge Charles Wilson, dissenting from the Eleventh 
Circuit’s opinion in McNair, wrote that he found Judge Gilman’s 
approach preferable to that of the Cooey majority, “which effectively 
requires a death-sentenced prisoner to file a method-of-execution 
claim years before his execution is to take place, during which time 
the challenged protocol could be materially changed.”103 
 
 98. Cooey II, 479 F.3d at 426 (Gilman, J., dissenting). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 429. 
 101. Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey III), 489 F.3d 775, 776 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gilman, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The district judge who originally denied the state’s 
statute-of-limitations defense in Cooey has noted in subsequent cases (which are confusingly 
also captioned Cooey) his continued disagreement with the Sixth Circuit’s rationale in Cooey. 
See Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey IV), No. 2:04-cv-1156, 2008 WL 4065809, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 
25, 2008) (“The Court can continue to disagree with the Cooey rationale . . . . But this Court’s 
opinion on those issues no longer matters.”). 
 102. Getsy v. Strickland (Getsy II), 577 F.3d 320, 321 (6th Cir. 2009) (Moore, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc); see also Getsy v. Strickland (Getsy I), 577 F.3d 309, 316 (6th 
Cir. 2009) (Moore, J., concurring) (“I find it unconscionable that by invoking a statute-of-
limitations defense, the State should be able to execute a person by a procedure that a court 
may ultimately find cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.”). 
 103. McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1178 (11th Cir. 2008) (Wilson, J., dissenting). As 
discussed previously, the district court in Cooey also rejected as “potentially wasteful and 
possibly absurd” the requirement that a death row inmate file a method-of-execution challenge 
years before his actual execution. See supra text accompanying note 69. In 2006, one district 
court in Oklahoma dismissed a statute-of-limitations defense in a lethal-injection challenge with 
little discussion. In Anderson v. Evans, No. Civ-05-0825-F, 2006 WL 83093, at *2 (W.D. Okla. 
Jan. 11, 2006), the state alleged that the statute of limitations began at the time the plaintiffs 
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Alabama District Judge Myron Thompson took a different 
approach in his critique of the Cooey rationale. In Jones v. Allen,104 
Judge Thompson focused on the fact that a method-of-execution 
challenge is fundamentally different from most § 1983 challenges 
because the allegedly unconstitutional act has not yet occurred at the 
time the suit is filed; it is the execution itself that may violate the 
rights of the plaintiffs.105 In such a case, Judge Thompson held, “it 
defies logic, and is contrary to the common law of torts, to conclude 
that the statute of limitations has already run on a suit to prevent an 
unconstitutional act that has not yet occurred.”106 
Although Judge Thompson’s view on the statute-of-limitations 
issue was ultimately rejected by the Eleventh Circuit,107 several 
dissenting circuit judges have alluded to it in their critiques of Cooey. 
For example, dissenting from the denial of en banc review in Cooey, 
Judge Gilman cited Judge Thompson’s critique of the Cooey 
majority, saying that it “serves to support my view that the panel 
opinion in our case was wrongly decided.”108 Judge Wilson, dissenting 
in McNair, wrote that it was “noteworthy” that Judge Thompson had 
recognized in Jones that the statute of limitations is, for all intents and 
purposes, not even applicable in a case challenging the 
constitutionality of an event that has not yet occurred.109 In the Fifth 
Circuit, Judge Carolyn King recently noted that, although the statute 
of limitations was not squarely before the court and therefore was 
unnecessary to resolve in that particular case, “I am content to refer 
 
were sentenced to death. The court disagreed, holding that the statute of limitations accrued, at 
the earliest, when the state revealed its execution procedures. Because the lawsuit was timely 
filed under that conception of the accrual date, the discussion in Anderson was not extensive. Id. 
 104. Jones v. Allen, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (M.D. Ala. 2007). 
 105. Id. at 1149. 
 106. Id. In Jones, the court went on to hold that, although the lawsuit was not precluded by 
the statute of limitations, it was filed too late (under equitable principles) to warrant a stay of 
execution. Id. at 1154. Because the court’s order had the practical effect of barring Jones’s 
lawsuit, Jones appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed Judge Thompson’s stay denial. 
Id. Because the State of Alabama did not appeal from the rejection of its statute-of-limitations 
argument, Judge Thompson’s opinion on the matter remained good law (and was followed by at 
least one other federal district court judge in Alabama) until the Eleventh Circuit decided 
McNair. See Grayson v. Allen, 499 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1235 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (concurring with 
Judge Thompson’s opinion in Jones and adopting it by reference). 
 107. See supra text accompanying notes 91–93. 
 108. Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey III), 489 F.3d 775, 778 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gilman, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 109. McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1179 n.2 (11th Cir. 2008) (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
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the reader to Judge Myron Thompson’s thoughtful discussion of this 
subject” in Jones.110 
None of these circuit judges, however, went so far as to actually 
adopt Judge Thompson’s reasoning and dispense with a functional 
accrual date altogether. Judge Wilson, for example, despite favorably 
alluding to Judge Thompson’s reasoning, nonetheless concluded that 
the best approach to the accrual-date problem was to set the date 
after the completion of federal habeas review and when the prisoner 
has reason to know the details of the execution procedures.111 The 
vast majority of judges to consider the issue, then, would tie the 
accrual date to some event in the lengthy process by which a death 
row inmate seeks to overturn his conviction and death sentence. Part 
II discusses why this approach is misguided. Part III discusses its 
counterproductive policy implications. Then Part IV explains why 
Judge Thompson’s approach—that the statute of limitations does not 
apply when the tort has not yet occurred—is preferable in all regards. 
II.  FALLING AT THE MARGINS OF HABEAS? INCORPORATION OF 
AEDPA RULES AND PRINCIPLES 
Appeals from capital convictions and sentences—including 
postconviction attacks on those convictions and sentences—have 
virtually nothing in common with § 1983 method-of-execution 
challenges. The former challenge the fairness of the trial proceedings 
in an effort to secure a new trial. The latter do not seek to disturb the 
underlying conviction or sentence. Instead, they are civil rights 
actions that allege that the procedures the state has in place to 
conduct the execution are constitutionally insufficient to protect the 
condemned inmate from an unacceptably high risk of serious harm. 
Whereas an appeal or habeas petition seeks to vacate the underlying 
conviction or death sentence, a § 1983 action seeks only an injunction 
prohibiting the execution until the unconstitutional circumstances 
have been rectified. Although courts following Cooey have claimed 
that method-of-execution challenges “implicate many of the same 
comity concerns AEDPA was designed to address,”112 the analogy is 
faulty. For this reason—as several of the dissenting judges have 
 
 110. Walker v. Epps, 287 F. App’x 371, 379 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 111. Id. at 1179. 
 112. McNair, 515 F.3d at 1175; see also Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 421–22 
(6th Cir. 2007). 
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pointed out—it is fundamentally wrong to look to AEDPA for 
guidance in the absence of any established accrual date.113 
Prior to the passage of AEDPA in 1996, there was no statute of 
limitations for the filing of a federal petition for writ of habeas 
corpus.114 Congress established a statute of limitations in AEDPA to 
“reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal 
sentences, particularly capital cases.”115 In particular, Congress 
wanted to limit the ability of death row inmates to delay their 
executions by filing habeas petitions challenging their state court 
convictions and sentences.116 As President Bill Clinton stated when he 
signed AEDPA into law, “For too long, and in too many cases, 
endless death row appeals have stood in the way of justice being 
served.”117 The problem, in the view of AEDPA’s drafters, was that 
the late filing of federal habeas petitions initiated necessarily lengthy 
review processes that worked to forestall the executions of prisoners 
sentenced long ago in state court.118 After all, once a federal habeas 
petition is filed, it can take years for the case to be resolved.119 
 
 113. See, e.g., Cooey II, 479 F.3d at 425 (Gilman, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s use 
of the AEDPA statute-of-limitations accrual date). 
 114. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 n.1 (2006) (“Until AEDPA took effect in 
1996, no statute of limitations applied to habeas petitions.”); see also Brandon Segal, Habeas 
Corpus, Equitable Tolling, and AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations: Why the Schlup v. Delo 
Gateway Standard for Claims of Actual Innocence Fails to Alleviate the Plight of Wrongfully 
Convicted Americans, 31 U. HAW. L. REV. 225, 231 (2008) (“[T]hroughout its history, habeas 
corpus was not subject to any statute of limitations or time limit. The [AEDPA], in turn, 
represented a distinct milestone and change in direction for the function of habeas.”). 
 115. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003); see also Jake Sussman, Unlimited 
Innocence: Recognizing an “Actual Innocence” Exception to AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations, 27 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 343, 358–59 (2001) (referring to AEDPA’s “clearly stated 
purpose to reduce delay and induce finality in postconviction collateral attacks”). 
 116. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The 
Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 20–21 (1997) (discussing the Republican Contract with America, 
which claimed that “prisoners on death row [could] almost indefinitely delay their punishment” 
and sought strict filing deadlines as a result). 
 117. Presidential Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 719 (Apr. 24, 1996). 
 118. See, e.g., Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. 
REV. 381, 400 (1996) (describing the legislative history of AEDPA and the concern regarding 
abuse of habeas to delay punishment). 
 119. One judge on the Ninth Circuit has calculated that, in California, federal habeas 
proceedings in capital cases take an average of 6.2 years to be resolved at the district court level. 
Arthur L. Alarcon, Remedies for California’s Death Row Deadlock, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 697, 748 
(2007). The cases take another several years to make their way through the appellate process. 
See id. at 749 (providing the average delays in various appellate stages). 
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But it only makes sense to incorporate AEDPA principles in the 
§ 1983 method-of-execution challenge context if habeas proceedings 
are sufficiently akin to § 1983 suits. Until the Supreme Court decided 
Nelson in 2004, it was not clear whether a method-of-execution 
challenge was properly the subject of a habeas petition or a § 1983 
lawsuit; if anything, most attorneys assumed the former.120 Prior to 
Nelson, then, one could argue (and states routinely did) that method-
of-execution challenges that were treated as habeas petitions should 
be subject to the same restrictions as actual habeas petitions.121 
It is now clear, however, that method-of-execution challenges 
brought pursuant to § 1983 are not properly treated as habeas 
petitions.122 In Nelson, an Alabama inmate filed a § 1983 lawsuit 
shortly before his scheduled execution, alleging that the state’s intent 
to use a “cut-down procedure” to establish venous access—an intent 
which he had just learned about days earlier—violated his rights 
under the Eighth Amendment.123 The state moved to dismiss, arguing 
that the § 1983 lawsuit was the “functional equivalent” of a second or 
successive habeas petition that should be denied for failure to comply 
with the stringent requirements necessary to file such petitions.124 The 
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that, so long as a successful § 1983 
action would not necessarily invalidate the inmate’s conviction or 
death sentence, it did not have to be characterized as a habeas 
petition.125 Put another way, only if the § 1983 action threatened to 
invalidate the underlying conviction or sentence would it have to 
comply with the rules governing habeas petitions.126 
 
 120. See supra note 32. 
 121. See Berger, supra note 10, at 273 n.68 (explaining that, prior to Nelson and Hill, “some 
lower courts had dismissed lethal injection claims by treating them as ‘successive’ habeas 
petitions, even though they had been filed as § 1983 actions”). 
 122. It remains unsettled whether method-of-execution challenges must be filed as § 1983 
lawsuits as opposed to incorporated within habeas petitions. See supra note 85. 
 123. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 641–42 (2004). According to Alabama prison 
officials, the plan was to “make a 2-inch incision in petitioner’s arm or leg” using only local 
anesthesia. Id. at 641. “There was no assurance that a physician would perform or even be 
present for the procedure.” Id. 
 124. Id. at 642. 
 125. Id. at 646–47. 
 126. For example, in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the plaintiff sought to recover 
damages under § 1983 for an allegedly unconstitutional arrest and conviction. Id. at 479. The 
Supreme Court held that under those circumstances, the plaintiff must establish that the 
conviction or sentence has been legally invalidated. Id. at 486–87. If not, the claim for damages 
is not cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487. Accordingly, “when a state prisoner seeks damages in 
a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would 
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Just two years after Nelson, the Court took up the issue again in 
Hill v. McDonough and reaffirmed the principle it had articulated in 
Nelson. As opposed to the “cut-down” procedure challenged in 
Nelson, the petitioner in Hill was challenging the three-drug lethal-
injection formula Florida intended to use to execute him.127 
Otherwise, the issues were quite similar, and the Court made quick 
work of the state’s attempt to convince the Court to water down or 
overrule outright its decision in Nelson. Instead, the Court 
unanimously reiterated that method-of-execution challenges, so long 
as they do not seek to overturn the underlying conviction or sentence, 
may properly be filed as § 1983 lawsuits rather than habeas 
petitions.128 
If, as Nelson and Hill demonstrate, a method-of-execution 
challenge is an altogether separate matter from a collateral challenge 
to a conviction or death sentence, one may legitimately question why 
the statute-of-limitations accrual dates should mirror each other. 
After all, one significant difference between a habeas claim and a 
§ 1983 challenge is that the former, if timely filed, must go through a 
lengthy review process that can take more than a decade to 
complete,129 whereas a timely filed but dilatory § 1983 lawsuit will be 
dismissed almost immediately if the prisoner cannot win a stay of 
execution.130 
Moreover, although Cooey and its progeny tend to state in 
conclusory fashion that the concerns that animated AEDPA are 
relevant in the method-of-execution context, none of these cases 
actually explores whether the parallel holds up. Cooey itself, for 
example, stated that “[a]ll of the same concerns” are relevant in the 
method-of-execution context but explained this statement only by 
saying that, “[l]ike federal habeas actions, a § 1983 method of 
 
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Id. But “if the district court 
determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of 
any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to 
proceed.” Id. 
 127. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 581 (2006). 
 128. Id. 
 129. See supra note 119. 
 130. When a court determines that a method-of-execution challenge has been filed for the 
purpose of delay, it will deny a stay of execution, and the litigation will typically be unable to 
proceed. See infra text accompanying notes 160–67. 
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execution challenge ‘implicates values beyond the concerns of the 
parties.’”131 
It is true that both method-of-execution challenges and habeas 
petitions are filed by death row inmates and have the potential to 
delay scheduled execution dates. But the analogy to AEDPA 
employed by Cooey and its progeny appears to be based on nothing 
more than that fact. Some courts’ liberal use of one line from the 
Supreme Court’s Nelson opinion is illustrative of the thin reed 
supporting the comparison. 
In Nelson, the Court stated that method-of-execution challenges 
“fall at the margins of habeas.”132 On its face, and devoid of context, 
such a statement could mean a number of things. One interpretation 
could be that § 1983 challenges are not identical to habeas actions but 
are similar enough to be considered habeas actions “at the margins,” 
and perhaps for statute-of-limitations purposes. The Sixth Circuit in 
Cooey and the Eleventh Circuit in Jones both employed this 
interpretation. Cooey noted that the concerns that led to the passage 
of AEDPA “apply with equal force” in a lethal-injection challenge 
because such challenges “fall at the margins of habeas.”133 Likewise, 
McNair quoted Nelson’s “margins of habeas” language and concluded 
that method-of-execution challenges therefore “implicate many of the 
same comity concerns AEDPA was designed to address.”134 
But the line from Nelson supports no such conclusion. The full 
context of the quote is as follows: 
We note that our holding here is consistent with our approach to 
civil rights damages actions, which, like method-of-execution 
challenges, fall at the margins of habeas. Although damages are not 
an available habeas remedy, we have previously concluded that a 
§ 1983 suit for damages that would “necessarily imply” the invalidity 
of the fact of an inmate’s conviction, or “necessarily imply” the 
invalidity of the length of an inmate’s sentence, is not cognizable 
under § 1983 unless and until the inmate obtains favorable 
termination of a state, or federal habeas, challenge to his conviction 
or sentence.135 
 
 131. Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 422 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Acosta v. 
Artuz, 221 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
 132. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 646 (2004). 
 133. Cooey II, 479 F.3d at 421 (citing Nelson, 541 U.S. at 646). 
 134. McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1175 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Nelson, 541 U.S. at 646). 
 135. Nelson, 541 U.S. at 646. 
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In other words, a § 1983 suit is not like a habeas petition, unless its 
success would necessarily undermine the underlying conviction and 
sentence. Some civil rights suits seeking damages—such as when a 
prisoner seeks damages for an unlawful arrest136—implicate habeas 
relief because a successful suit necessarily implies the invalidity of the 
prisoner’s sentence. In Nelson, however, the Court went on to make 
clear that the method-of-execution challenge at issue in that case was 
not such a lawsuit.137 As a result, the § 1983 challenge could not be re-
characterized as a habeas petition.138 The Court reiterated this precise 
point in Hill. The lethal-injection lawsuits at issue in Nelson and Hill, 
the Court explained, “did not challenge an execution procedure 
required by law, so granting relief would not imply the unlawfulness 
of the lethal injection sentence.”139 
Thus, the extent of the analogy appears to be that both federal 
habeas petitions and method-of-execution challenges have the 
potential to delay the executions of death row inmates. Because 
AEDPA was intended to cut down on such delays, the theory seems 
to go, why not use the same statute of limitations for method-of-
execution challenges? Perhaps this approach has surface appeal, to 
the extent it is desirable to have some symmetry in one procedural 
aspect of two different kinds of legal actions initiated by death row 
inmates. But it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the selection of 
an accrual date based on a loose analogy to a statute governing a 
different kind of proceeding is simply arbitrary.140 
 
 136. See supra note 126. 
 137. Nelson, 541 U.S. at 646. 
 138. See id. 
 139. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 588 (2006); see also Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 
479 F.3d 412, 425 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gilman, J., dissenting) (“[A] § 1983 action is not an attack on 
the validity of the death-sentenced inmate’s conviction or sentence.”). Interestingly, the district 
judge in Cooey who originally rejected the state’s statute-of-limitations defense referred to the 
Sixth Circuit’s comment about method-of-execution challenges falling “at the margins of 
habeas” as “unfortunate.” Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey IV), No. 2:04-cv-1156, 2008 WL 4065809, 
at *4 n.3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2008). The court did so, however, in the context of rejecting a 
death row inmate’s claim that certain favorable federal habeas case law applied to his lethal-
injection challenge. The Sixth Circuit’s use of the “margins of habeas” language was not, the 
court noted, “a blanket invitation to conflate habeas principles at will.” Id. 
 140. One Sixth Circuit judge described the use of habeas rules to bar § 1983 civil rights suits 
as follows: “[Cooey’s] ill-advised rule unduly entangles a prisoner’s challenges to the validity of 
his or her sentence with the wholly distinct question of whether the method by which he or she 
will be executed—assuming the Court ultimately denies habeas relief—can withstand 
constitutional scrutiny.” Getsy v. Strickland (Getsy I), 577 F.3d 309, 315 (6th Cir. 2009) (Moore, 
J., concurring). Indeed, the twin keystones of modern habeas jurisprudence—comity with the 
states and finality—have little application here. Finality is not an issue because courts’ broad 
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The reasoning supplied by Cooey and its progeny does not dispel 
the concern that the choice of accrual date is arbitrary. Cooey pointed 
out that a tort claim generally accrues when the plaintiff “can file suit 
and obtain relief,”141 and reasoned that a death row inmate can do so 
after his conviction has become final on direct review.142 For the 
reasons discussed in Part III.B, it is not at all clear that a death row 
inmate can actually obtain relief on a method-of-execution challenge 
filed years before his scheduled execution. In many cases, such a 
lawsuit would likely be dismissed as unripe, or perhaps as lacking 
standing.143 But if one does assume that a death row inmate could file 
a method-of-execution challenge and obtain relief following direct 
appeal, one would also have to assume that he could file suit the day 
after his death sentence is imposed. Why should he have to wait until 
his direct appeal is complete? 
This question was not addressed in Cooey, but the Eleventh 
Circuit in McNair answered it sua sponte. “[B]y requiring a defendant 
to wait to bring a claim [until] after direct review is complete (as 
opposed, say, to when the sentence is first imposed),” the McNair 
court noted, “we ensure claims are not brought prematurely, before 
the state courts have had an adequate opportunity to correct any 
infirmities in the defendant’s conviction or sentence.”144 This 
reasoning does not withstand scrutiny. 
First, it is not true that setting the accrual date after direct appeal 
precludes a suit from being filed prior to that date. As discussed in 
Part IV, a claim can be ripe before it accrues.145 More fundamentally, 
however, the selection of direct appeal as the point at which one can 
be sure that there has been an adequate opportunity to review the 
constitutionality of inmates’ trials is simply one such spot along the 
timeline of the appeals process. Why not at the conclusion of state 
postconviction proceedings, when the state courts have had the 
opportunity to review the extra-record evidence, such as claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, that so often form the basis of 
 
equitable power guards against the use of method-of-execution challenges as vehicles for delay. 
See infra text accompanying notes 162–71. And comity also need not apply because there has 
been no state court adjudication. 
 141. Cooey II, 479 F.3d at 416 (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)). 
 142. Id. at 419. 
 143. See infra text accompanying notes 198–200. 
 144. McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1176 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 145. See infra text accompanying notes 253–55. 
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constitutional challenges to death row inmates’ trials?146 Why not, as 
the dissenting circuit judges have suggested, at the conclusion of 
federal habeas review, when the federal courts have had the 
opportunity to review the state court convictions?147 After all, as many 
as 40 percent of capital cases get overturned in federal habeas 
proceedings “due to serious error.”148 If courts are genuinely 
concerned with discouraging lethal-injection challenges until the 
constitutional infirmities have been rooted out of capital trials, 
waiting until federal habeas review is complete would appear to be 
the most rational approach.149 
None of these choices, however, have anything to do with the 
purposes of statutes of limitations. Therein lies the fallacy of tying the 
accrual date to a step in the appeals and postconviction process. The 
primary purpose of a statute of limitations is to provide repose to 
defendants, protecting them from having to litigate “stale claims.”150 
The idea is to ensure “essential fairness to defendants and . . . [bar] a 
plaintiff who has ‘slept on his rights.’”151 More specifically, the 
Supreme Court has explained that statutes of limitations “are 
designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the 
 
 146. See Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death 
Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 16 (1990) (discussing “manifold colorable claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel” that typically comprise most postconviction proceedings). 
 147. See, e.g., McNair, 515 F.3d at 1179 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a better 
approach is to fix the date of accrual when the defendant’s habeas challenge is exhausted); 
Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 428–29 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gilman, J., dissenting) 
(“This accrual date provides clarity and certainty to both the death-sentenced inmate and the 
State that the sentence is final and not susceptible to attack, that the execution date is set, and 
that the protocol for that execution is likely fixed.”). 
 148. James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West & Jonathan Lloyd, Capital Attrition: 
Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1849 (2000). 
 149. It may be suggested that placing the accrual date at the conclusion of direct review 
accounts for the fact that the state can technically initiate execution proceedings at that point, 
and it cannot do so until that point. But a death-sentenced inmate’s ability to file a method-of-
execution challenge is not necessarily related to the state’s technical ability to initiate execution 
proceedings. In fact, capitally charged defendants occasionally challenge the method of 
execution in pretrial litigation. One such challenge in Ohio was successful. See State v. Rivera, 
No. 04-CR-065940 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. June 10, 2008) (ordering that “if defendants herein are 
convicted and sentenced to death by lethal injection, that the protocol employ the use of a lethal 
injection of a single, anesthetic drug”). In any event, there is no evidence that any state in the 
modern death-penalty era has made a serious attempt to execute an inmate immediately upon 
the conclusion of direct review. 
 150. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 15 (2000); see also infra text accompanying 
notes 194–98. 
 151. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974) (quoting Burnett v. N.Y. 
Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965)). 
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revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has 
been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.”152 
Such concerns are nonexistent in the method-of-execution 
context. When the tort has yet to take place, there can be no concern 
about staleness. Method-of-execution challenges—and particularly 
lethal-injection challenges—are about the prison officials’ present 
intentions with respect to the administration of their execution 
procedures.153 By definition, the evidence cannot be lost and the 
claims cannot be stale because the litigation seeks to stop a process 
that the state intends to carry out in the future. In this way, challenges 
to lethal injection are akin to other requests for injunctive relief 
seeking to stop a proposed action from occurring, such as the 
chopping down of a sacred tree,154 in which the statute of limitations 
never even enters the picture. Or perhaps they are like continuing-
violation cases, in which “conduct which repeats itself or that is 
continuing in nature is subject to ready investigation and 
confirmation and does not present the staleness problems that 
statutes of limitations are primarily designed to prevent.”155 One of 
the reasons that the courts addressing this issue in the lethal-injection 
context have found themselves with so little precedent to guide them 
is that defendants do not typically raise the statute of limitations as a 
defense to actions seeking injunctive relief. 
 
 152. R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1944); see also James 
R. MacAyeal, The Discovery Rule and the Continuing Violation Doctrine as Exceptions to the 
Statute of Limitations for Civil Environmental Penalty Claims, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 589, 590–92 
(1996) (discussing various policies that statutes of limitations are designed to promote). 
 153. See supra text accompanying notes 42–46. 
 154. See Richard Brenneman, Tree-Sitters Get a Day in Court, Cal Bears to Move to Interim 
Venue, BERKELEY DAILY PLANET, Nov. 20, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.berkeley
dailyplanet.com/issue/2008-11-20/article/31626?headline=Tree-Sitters-Get-a-Day-in-Court-Cal-
Bears-to-Move-to-Interim-Venue (discussing a lawsuit filed to enjoin the cutting down of a 
grove of trees on the campus of the University of California, Berkeley). Indeed, one might 
legitimately question whether the statute of limitations can even be raised in a suit seeking 
solely injunctive—that is, equitable—relief. As several of the cases following Cooey have 
pointed out, however, the Supreme Court in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), appears to 
have held that statutes of limitations apply to all § 1983 cases (although Wilson itself was a 
damages case). Id. at 275–76; see also McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(citing Wilson to justify the application of the statute of limitations); Chester v. Beard, 657 F. 
Supp. 2d 534, 539–40 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (discussing whether Wilson stands for the proposition that 
the statute of limitations applies to § 1983 cases seeking solely injunctive relief). 
 155. MacAyeal, supra note 152, at 616–17. In Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 
(1982), the Supreme Court applied the continuing-violation doctrine to the statute of limitations 
in the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2006). Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. 
at 380 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a)). 
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Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit in Cooey applied the statute of 
limitations and selected completion of direct review as an “attractive 
choice” for accrual. It did not do so, however, to vindicate the 
principles of statutes of limitations, but rather to “mark[] the point at 
which the state has rendered its criminal judgment final and, absent 
collateral civil proceedings, the point at which the state sets the 
execution date.”156 For reasons already discussed, it makes little sense 
to so casually dismiss the “collateral civil proceedings” that are an 
integral part of virtually every death penalty case and that can take 
more than a decade to complete.157 It is far more realistic to give death 
row inmates the practical ability to file a method-of-execution 
challenge closer to their impending execution. For that reason, 
starting the statute of limitations at the end of federal habeas review, 
as the dissenting circuit court judges would have it, makes more 
practical sense than requiring prisoners to file claims years, and even 
decades, before their executions. 
As a doctrinal matter, however, it is no less arbitrary to choose 
the end of habeas review as the accrual date than it is to choose an 
earlier point.158 Neither is tied to the purposes of statutes of 
limitations. As Judge Thompson put it in Jones, “There is no rhyme 
or reason in choosing among these options precisely because they are 
little more than stand-ins for the actual tortious event the court would 
otherwise look for in a run-of-the-mill § 1983 case.”159 
Not only is it arbitrary to select any date, let alone one as early in 
the process as the completion of direct review, but it is also 
unnecessary. To the extent courts have adopted the AEDPA statute 
of limitations to reduce delays or impede the ability of death row 
inmates to game the system and forestall their executions, there is a 
simple alternative mechanism available—denying a request to stay an 
execution. 
 
 156. Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 419 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 157. See supra text accompanying note 103. 
 158. Imagine, for example, a death row inmate who files a § 1983 lawsuit alleging that 
dangerous conditions in the prison have risen to the level of a constitutional violation and seeks 
an injunction to improve those conditions. The defendant prison officials in that hypothetical 
case could never credibly allege that the statute of limitations on such a challenge should be tied 
to the date on which the plaintiff inmate completed his direct appeals (or his federal habeas 
proceedings, for that matter). Because the constitutional violation alleged has nothing to do 
with the underlying conviction and sentence for which the plaintiff is on death row, the statute-
of-limitations accrual date would be similarly unrelated. In fact, as a matter of practice, the 
statute of limitations is never invoked by defendant prison officials in such cases. 
 159. Jones v. Allen, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149 (M.D. Ala. 2007). 
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III.  UNNECESSARY CONFLATION OF STATUTE-OF-LIMITATIONS 
AND EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS 
When a death row inmate files a § 1983 lawsuit challenging a 
state’s method of execution, an execution date may or may not have 
already been set. As long as no execution date has been set, there is 
no need for the inmate to request a stay of execution. But if a date 
has been set prior to the lawsuit, or if it is set during the pendency of 
the lawsuit, the inmate will typically need to request a stay from the 
court to complete the § 1983 litigation before his impending execution 
renders the proceedings moot.160 
Courts presented with stay-of-execution requests have familiar 
principles to guide them, as they typically look to the criteria 
necessary to grant a preliminary injunction: a strong likelihood of 
success on the merits, the possibility of irreparable injury to the 
plaintiff, a balance of the hardships favoring the plaintiff, and the 
advancement of the public interest.161 With respect to stays of 
execution in particular, the Supreme Court has explained that states 
have a “strong interest in enforcing [their] criminal judgments 
without undue interference from the federal courts”162 and has 
established a “strong equitable presumption against the grant of a 
stay where a claim could have been brought at such a time as to allow 
consideration of the merits without requiring entry of a stay.”163 In 
other words, if the § 1983 lawsuit is not filed in time to run its course 
before the execution date, but it could have been, courts typically will 
not grant a stay. The § 1983 litigation can proceed, but it can also be 
mooted by the plaintiff’s execution.164 
 
 160. See Ellen Kreitzberg & David Richter, But Can It Be Fixed? A Look at Constitutional 
Challenges to Lethal Injection Executions, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 445, 464–65 (2007) 
(describing stay litigation in the context of a § 1983 method-of-execution challenge). 
 161. Id. at 464 n.110 (citing Johnson v. Cal. State Bd. of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430 
(9th Cir. 1995)). 
 162. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006). 
 163. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 650 (2004). 
 164. See Kreitzberg & Richter, supra note 160, at 465 (“[E]ven though a § 1983 claim 
requires a plaintiff only to prove the constitutional challenge by a preponderance of the 
evidence, if an inmate does not make a greater showing, the execution stay will not be granted. 
The execution takes place before a hearing can be held on the constitutional issue.”). This is 
precisely what happened in Hill and in Jones. See infra text accompanying notes 169–71. In both 
cases, the petitioner’s § 1983 action would have been allowed to proceed but for the fact that, 
according to the court, the equities did not favor the granting of the stay that would be 
necessary to actually litigate the case. 
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The most successful § 1983 challenges to lethal injection have 
taken many months to litigate.165 As a result, depending on the 
circumstances, it may not be prudent for a death row inmate to wait 
until the completion of federal habeas review to file a method-of-
execution challenge. In many states, the completion of that review 
triggers the setting of an execution date, sometimes within months or 
even weeks.166 An inmate who files a § 1983 suit on the day the 
Supreme Court denies review of his habeas petition may well need to 
request a stay of execution to litigate his civil case. If he had the 
information necessary to file the claim sooner, the district court may 
deny the stay request for equitable reasons.167 
All of this raises the question: why is the statute-of-limitations 
defense necessary to ward off dilatory method-of-execution 
challenges? If a death row inmate waits too long to file a § 1983 
challenge, such that a court can say that he could have brought it in 
time to “allow consideration of the merits without requiring entry of a 
stay,”168 the court will deny the stay, and there likely will not be time 
to litigate the method-of-execution challenge. If the claim could not 
have been filed any earlier, then the court will grant the stay, and the 
plaintiff will be able to litigate his case without fear of his execution 
mooting the case. This latter scenario should not be the subject of any 
concern, however, because, by definition, if the court grants a stay, 
there has been no undue delay on the part of the plaintiff. If there is 
no dilatory filing, and thus no attempt to abuse the legal process to 
stave off an execution, the concerns animating the AEDPA statute of 
limitations simply do not apply. 
A. Rejection of the “Veto Power” Myth 
The Cooey approach suffers from a fundamental flaw: the 
conflation of statute-of-limitations and equitable principles. What 
makes the conflation of these principles puzzling is that the Supreme 
Court could not have been clearer in both Nelson and Hill that 
 
 165. See Denno, supra note 31, at 107–16 (providing a lengthy history of the most successful 
modern method-of-execution challenges). 
 166. See, e.g., McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1175–76 (11th Cir. 2008) (discussing the 
practice in Alabama of setting execution dates soon after the Supreme Court denies review in 
federal habeas). 
 167. See Kreitzberg & Richter, supra note 160, at 465–67 (discussing the “strong equitable 
presumption” that courts frequently apply in refusing to grant a stay when a claim could have 
been brought earlier). 
 168. Nelson, 541 U.S. at 650. 
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equitable considerations are available and sufficient to protect the 
state from dilatory lawsuits. In Nelson, the Court said, “[T]he mere 
fact that an inmate states a cognizable § 1983 claim does not warrant 
the entry of a stay as a matter of right.”169 In Hill, the Court said, 
“Filing an action that can proceed under § 1983 does not entitle the 
complainant to an order staying an execution as a matter of course.”170 
In fact, although the Supreme Court ruled in his favor, Clarence Hill 
was ultimately executed because the lower federal courts refused to 
grant him a stay of execution following the Court’s ruling.171 
Judge Thompson was well aware of the distinction between the 
statute-of-limitations and the equitable considerations available to 
him. In Jones, the court rejected the state’s statute-of-limitations 
defense.172 But, because the lawsuit was filed while an execution date 
was pending, the court necessarily went on to consider whether to 
grant a stay. Judge Thompson reviewed the history of the case and 
concluded that, although Jones filed his § 1983 lawsuit within the 
statute of limitations, he could have filed it sufficiently earlier such 
that he would not have had to seek a stay of execution at all.173 As a 
result, citing Hill and Nelson, the court denied the stay.174 But that 
inquiry was entirely separate from the inquiry about the statute-of-
limitations accrual date. In fact, the § 1983 lawsuit technically 
survived Judge Thompson’s ruling; the court explicitly noted that if 
Jones were able to obtain a stay of his execution on some other 
grounds, “the instant § 1983 litigation [would] proceed as 
scheduled.”175 Jones did not receive any other stay, and he was 
executed on May 3, 2007.176 His challenge to lethal injection was never 
heard in the federal courts because he filed the lawsuit too late—not 
too late under the statute of limitations, but too late to obtain a stay 
of his execution. 
Jones demonstrates the ease with which the two concepts can be 
doctrinally separated. Yet the Cooey line of cases is riddled with 
equitable concerns masquerading as statute-of-limitations doctrine. 
 
 169. Id. at 649. 
 170. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 583–84 (2006). 
 171. See Denno, supra note 31, at 113 (“While Hill emerged successful from the Supreme 
Court, the victory proved to be of little use to Hill himself.”). 
 172. Jones v. Allen, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1151 (M.D. Ala. 2007). 
 173. Id. at 1151–53. 
 174. Id. at 1154. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Execution Database, supra note 62. 
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The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in McNair is illustrative. In the course 
of adopting the Cooey rationale, the McNair court rejected the 
approach suggested by Judge Gilman, dissenting in Cooey, which 
would have set the accrual date at the completion of federal habeas 
review. The court stated, “Were we to hold a § 1983 method of 
execution challenge accrues on the date federal habeas review ends, 
we would effectively provide capital defendants with a veto power 
over the state’s ability to effectuate its judgment at the close of 
federal habeas review.”177 The McNair court’s concern echoed that 
raised in Cooey: “[S]etting an accrual date at the point of . . . 
exhaustion of federal collateral remedies adds a significant period of 
delay to a state’s ability to exercise its sovereign power and to finalize 
its judgments.”178 
The concern in McNair and Cooey that setting the accrual date at 
the completion of federal habeas review would give inmates “veto 
power” over their executions is entirely unfounded. As the Jones case 
illustrates, nothing precludes a judge from denying a stay of execution 
to an inmate whom the court concludes has waited too long to bring 
suit. In fact, it happens all the time.179 A death row inmate would only 
be able to frustrate the state’s attempt to “effectuate its judgment at 
the close of federal habeas review”180 if he were able to file a lawsuit 
that had a likelihood of success on the merits and was based on 
sufficiently recent discovery or information such that the court would 
find it could not have been filed earlier. In that case, presumably, the 
inmate’s “veto power” would be warranted. In all other cases, the 
inmate would have no such power because of the courts’ frequently 
exercised equitable authority to deny requested stays of execution. 
B. Dangers of an Unnecessarily Early Accrual Date 
One might conclude that the conflation of statute of limitations 
and equitable concerns, although doctrinally imprecise, works no 
undue disadvantage to a death row inmate. After all, if a prisoner sat 
on his rights and filed a method-of-execution challenge too late, one 
might think there is little concern in holding that the lawsuit is barred 
by the statute of limitations. And that may be true in many cases; 
there is no conceptual problem with the notion that frivolous § 1983 
 
 177. McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1175–76 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 178. Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 419 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 179. See Kreitzberg & Richter, supra note 160, at 465. 
 180. McNair, 515 F.3d at 1176. 
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method-of-execution challenges cannot be used simply to delay an 
otherwise lawful execution. The problem lies in those cases in which a 
petitioner did not unduly delay the filing of a method-of-execution 
challenge but did file the lawsuit many years after his direct appeals 
concluded, when, for example, recent information casts doubt upon 
the reliability of the procedures the state intends to implement. Such 
a case would be precluded by the Cooey approach, but there is no 
principled reason why that should be. 
Recall the case of Ohio death row inmate Romell Broom.181 
Broom’s case is infamous, as it is the only time in U.S. history that a 
lethal-injection execution has been cancelled because prison officials 
could not carry out the process.182 
Well before his execution, however, Broom and his counsel were 
aware that Ohio prison officials had a troubling record when it came 
to accessing inmates’ veins during executions. Joseph Clark’s 
execution in May 2006 lasted almost ninety minutes, during which 
time prison officials tried and initially failed to access Clark’s veins.183 
At one point, Clark raised his head off the gurney and said, “It’s not 
working.”184 Later in the execution, Clark asked, “Can you just give 
me something by mouth to end this?”185 After more struggling to set a 
new intravenous line, the execution continued and Clark was finally 
pronounced dead.186 Following the Clark execution, and in light of the 
 
 181. See supra text accompanying notes 1–8. 
 182. Bob Driehaus, Ohio Plans to Try Again as Execution Goes Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
17, 2009, at A16 (“This is the first time an execution by lethal injection in the United States has 
failed and then been rescheduled.”); see also Pete Krouse, Gov. Ted Strickland Orders a 
Temporary Halt to the Planned Execution of Romell Broom, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Sept. 
15, 2009, at A1 (referring to Broom’s halted execution as “unprecedented”). 
 183. Adam Liptak, Trouble Finding Inmate’s Veins Slows Lethal Injection in Ohio, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 3, 2006, at A16. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Jim Provance, Ohio Designs Single-Drug Execution, THE BLADE (Toledo), Nov. 14, 
2009, http://www.toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20091114/NEWS24/911140361 
(“Following similar problems in the 2006 execution of Joseph Lewis Clark, formerly of Toledo, 
the state made minor changes but decided to retain the three-drug process.”). 
 186. Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Botched Execution Leads to Ohio Review, WASH. POST, May 
12, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/11/AR2006051101618.
html (“The team then attached a shunt to Clark’s other arm but apparently tried to administer 
the lethal drugs through the first shunt by mistake . . . . Clark . . . was executed after officials 
switched the drugs to the proper line.”); see also Lloyd de Vries, Ohio Execution Problems Raise 
Qualms, CBSNEWS.COM, May 3, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/05/03/national/
main1576011.shtml (“The execution team . . . worked for about 25 minutes to find a vein in 
Clark’s right arm before continuing with just the shunt in his left arm.”). 
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difficulties the execution team had in carrying out their tasks, Ohio 
prison officials convened to revise their lethal-injection protocol.187 
Broom filed a § 1983 complaint on April 25, 2007,188 more than 
two years before the state actually attempted to execute him. 
Referencing Clark’s botched execution, Broom alleged that Ohio 
prison officials had failed to include in their most recent lethal-
injection protocols “a requirement that the personnel assigned to 
establish and maintain the intravenous (IV) lines are properly 
trained.”189 Broom went on to complain that Ohio officials had failed 
to account for the “real possibility . . . that IV access to Plaintiff’s 
veins cannot be successfully established or maintained.”190 
Nevertheless, on August 25, 2008, the district court, bound by Cooey, 
dismissed Broom’s complaint for failure to comply with the statute of 
limitations.191 
Unable to litigate his challenge to Ohio’s lethal-injection 
procedures, Broom was ultimately subjected to those procedures, 
suffering a botched execution attempt that elicited worldwide scorn 
and was the impetus for Ohio’s decision to abandon the three-drug 
lethal-injection formula altogether.192 What went wrong in his 
execution was exactly what he had filed a lawsuit to prevent—the 
inability of prison officials to access his veins. 
Broom filed his complaint well before his scheduled execution. 
He did not, and did not need to, seek a stay of his execution to litigate 
his case; the state did not even set an execution date until two years 
after Broom filed his lawsuit. Thus, none of the concerns that 
 
 187. See Reginald Fields, Ohio Changes the Procedure for Lethal Injection of Inmates, 
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Nov. 13, 2009, at A1 (“[W]holesale changes come on the heels of 
an embarrassing, botched attempt to execute [Broom] . . . .”). 
 188. Intervenor-Plaintiff’s Proposed Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, 
Attorney Fees, and Costs of Suit Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, supra note 6, at 21. 
 189. Id. at 11. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey IV), No. 2:04-cv-1156, 2008 WL 4065809, at *7 (S.D. 
Ohio Aug. 25, 2008) (“Cooey is controlling precedent with a dispositive rationale that the 
undersigned must fully recognize, credit, and apply. . . . For the foregoing reasons, this Court 
[grants] Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.”). In the meantime, Ohio officials had struggled to 
achieve venous access during another execution, that of Christopher Newton in May 2007. 
Newton’s execution lasted so long—more than two hours—that he was given a bathroom break 
in the middle of it. Scott Conroy, Bizarre Execution in Ohio, CBSNEWS.COM, May 24, 2007, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/05/24/national/main2848395.shtml. 
 192. See Urbina, supra note 37 (“Ohio’s decision came in response to the failed . . . 
execution of Romell Broom . . . .”). As of this writing, Ohio has not made a second attempt to 
execute Broom. 
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animated AEDPA and that would be relevant to an equitable 
determination of dilatoriness were at issue. Broom was simply denied 
his day in court because he did not file his claim within two years of 
the state’s adoption of lethal injection as a method of execution, a 
point in time that had nothing to do with his actual ability to file suit 
to enjoin the specific procedures Ohio intended to use to execute 
him.193 Had Broom been able to litigate his case, perhaps he would 
have been able to prevent the constitutional violation before it 
occurred, which is exactly what his suit was designed to do. 
As Broom’s case demonstrates, the exception contained within 
the Cooey approach—that the statute-of-limitations clock starts over 
when the written protocol is substantially changed194—is too narrow to 
be meaningful. The facts giving rise to Eighth Amendment challenges 
have far less to do with the written protocol than they do with the 
present ability of state officials to implement the written protocol in a 
reliable and humane manner.195 
One might argue that statutes of limitations will always preclude 
some meritorious claims, and one should not be concerned with 
plaintiffs who may suffer constitutional injury but do not initiate their 
lawsuits early enough. As the Supreme Court has said,  
The theory [of statutes of limitations] is that even if one has a just 
claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within 
the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in 
time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.196  
Under the Cooey approach that was applied to Broom’s case, 
however, Broom had to have filed a lawsuit in 2003, before Ohio’s 
 
 193. As my colleague Elisabeth Semel has put it, the Cooey decision “effectively insulated 
Ohio from any accountability for its method of execution.” Semel, supra note 4, at 859. 
 194. See, e.g., McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1174 (11th Cir. 2008) (“We hold a method of 
execution claim accrues on the later of the date on which state review is complete, or the date 
on which the capital litigant becomes subject to a new or substantially changed execution 
protocol.”). 
 195. One might suggest, then, that an answer to the accrual problem would be to simply 
expand the understanding of which circumstances would warrant resetting the statute-of-
limitations clock. It is true that some of the unfairness inherent in setting the accrual date so 
early would be mitigated if the clock restarted whenever new facts came to light—such as a 
recently botched execution, or the unavailability of recently manufactured drugs. The practical 
results may even be quite similar to those under the no-accrual-date approach advocated in Part 
IV. The problem with this solution to the accrual-date problem, however, is that it still suffers 
from the doctrinal confusion between ripeness and accrual that pervades Cooey and its progeny. 
See infra Part IV. 
 196. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944). 
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high-profile botched executions197 and before the extent of the 
problems associated with Ohio’s procedures were known to anyone. 
Nothing underlying the theory of statutes of limitations suggests 
courts should penalize plaintiffs who do not file lawsuits until they 
have adjudicable claims. 
The early accrual approach of Cooey is not just ill-advised—
because it threatens to subject death row inmates to torturous 
executions (or execution attempts) without affording them a 
meaningful opportunity to pursue their constitutional claims in 
court—the approach also has a number of practical flaws that render 
it unworkable and unsustainable in the long run. 
1. Forcing Unripe Claims.  The practical ability of death row 
inmates to challenge their method of execution years in advance is 
quite circumscribed. When inmates have attempted to file lethal-
injection challenges many years before their scheduled executions, 
those lawsuits typically have been dismissed as unripe on the theory 
that the state’s procedures may change before the execution or that 
the inmate might not be executed at all if his appeals succeed.198 
The Supreme Court has explained that the basic rationale of the 
ripeness doctrine is to avoid “entangling [courts] in abstract 
disagreements over administrative policies [and to] protect the 
agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision 
has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the 
challenging parties.”199 Forcing death row inmates to challenge their 
states’ lethal-injection procedures years in advance, or risk not being 
able to challenge them at all, creates just the kind of abstract 
entanglement that the ripeness doctrine is designed to prevent. Or, as 
Judge Gilman put it in his dissent in Cooey, “To require a petitioner 
to file a § 1983 action three to five years before his or her execution in 
order to obtain legal review of the lethal-injection protocol strikes me 
as counterintuitive, unduly harsh, and just plain wrong.”200 
 
 197. See supra text accompanying notes 183–87. 
 198. See Berger, supra note 10, at 294 (“Plaintiffs thus confront a catch-22: early claims can 
be dismissed as unripe, later claims as dilatory.”). 
 199. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967), abrogated on other grounds by 
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); see also Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the 
Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 161 (1987) (referring to Abbott Laboratories as containing 
the “leading discussion” of the ripeness doctrine). 
 200. Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 429 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gilman, J., 
dissenting). Cooey and its progeny also seem not to have considered whether a plaintiff 
challenging an execution protocol years in advance would even have standing to do so under 
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As discussed in Part I, the lethal-injection challenges currently 
being litigated do not simply challenge the protocols as written.201 
After the Supreme Court approved of Kentucky’s lethal-injection 
procedures in Baze v. Rees,202 many states have simply adopted that 
protocol on the theory that if it passed muster in Baze, it will pass 
muster in their courts as well. But as several courts and commentators 
have noted, what is written within the four corners of the protocol 
does not end the constitutional inquiry.203 As Professor Eric Berger 
has written, “Two execution procedures . . . can hardly be deemed 
‘substantially similar’ merely because they use the same drugs. As 
litigation has demonstrated, the procedure’s safety hinges on how the 
drugs are administered.”204 Put another way, “The factual grounding 
of Baze, and its specific review of Kentucky’s particular death-penalty 
program, caution against applying unquestioningly its result to any 
other case in which an inmate challenges a death-penalty protocol 
that uses the same three drugs that Kentucky utilizes.”205 
Instead, the key questions relate to how the state presently 
intends to administer the protocol. Who are the executioners? What 
is their background and experience? How updated is the equipment 
that will be used? How often have the executioners been trained? 
Were the execution drugs obtained properly? Has the expiration date 
on the drugs passed? A lethal-injection challenge is ripe when some 
or all of these questions can be answered. But it makes little sense to 
 
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), which requires the plaintiff to demonstrate 
that the threat of future injury to him is “real and immediate.” Id. at 102. See generally Linda E. 
Fisher, Caging Lyons: The Availability of Injunctive Relief in Section 1983 Actions, 18 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 1085 (1987) (discussing the implications of Lyons on cases seeking injunctive relief). 
 201. See supra text accompanying notes 42–46. 
 202. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008) (plurality opinion). 
 203. See, e.g., Jackson v. Danberg, 594 F.3d 210, 224 (3d Cir. 2010) (evaluating the “extra-
protocol elements” of Delaware’s execution protocol, which is, on paper, “identical” to the 
Kentucky protocol reviewed in Baze); Thorson v. Epps, No. 4:08CV129-WAP-DAS, 2009 WL 
1766806, at *1 (N.D. Miss. June 22, 2009) (asserting that an acknowledgement of the fact that 
Mississippi’s protocol is “substantially similar” to Kentucky’s does not end the constitutional 
inquiry under Baze); see also Berger, supra note 10, at 277 (“Given that the safety of a method 
of execution depends not just on the four corners of the written protocol but on the details of 
administration, a state’s procedure could not be deemed ‘substantially similar’ to Kentucky’s 
without discovery into that state’s actual practices—the training and qualifications of its 
execution team, the suitability of the equipment, the architecture of the execution facilities, and 
so on.”). 
 204. Berger, supra note 10, at 277 (footnote omitted). Berger also notes that another 
reading of the “substantially similar” language in Baze is that it refers only to the standard 
needed to obtain a stay. See id. at 276 n.86. 
 205. Chester v. Beard, 657 F. Supp. 2d 534, 543 (M.D. Pa. 2009). 
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even attempt to answer these questions several years before the 
plaintiff will actually be executed.206 
2. Judicial Inefficiency.  In addition to providing repose for 
defendants, statutes of limitations are also said to be grounded in 
solicitude for judicial economy.207 It is “awkward and wasteful for 
judicial resources to be used to decide stale claims on stale 
evidence.”208 Although the Cooey approach ostensibly seeks to avoid 
delay and unnecessary judicial wrangling, setting the statute-of-
limitations accrual date so early actually works against judicial 
efficiency. 
Even under the Cooey standard, if a state significantly changes 
its written procedures between the initial lethal-injection challenge 
and a plaintiff’s execution date, then the same plaintiff may be able to 
file a second suit.209 In other words, the fact that lethal injection was in 
place when an inmate lost on direct appeal ten years ago is irrelevant, 
because the same lethal-injection procedure may not be used now. 
This scenario is not merely hypothetical. For example, after the 
botched execution attempt of Romell Broom, Ohio dramatically 
changed its protocol—this time by eliminating two of the drugs in the 
three-drug sequence and creating a backup plan, in the event of IV 
access failure, that had never before been proposed for use in 
executions.210 As Judge Gilman pointed out in Cooey, “No statutory 
 
 206. See, e.g., McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1179 (11th Cir. 2008) (Wilson, J., dissenting) 
(“I . . . cannot accept the majority’s conclusion that [plaintiff’s] cause of action began to accrue 
five years before his execution date was set, during which time Alabama could, and in fact did, 
amend its lethal injection protocol.”); Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 429 (6th Cir. 
2007) (Gilman, J., dissenting) (“To require a petitioner to file a § 1983 action three to five years 
before his or her execution in order to obtain legal review of the lethal-injection protocol strikes 
me as counterintuitive, unduly harsh, and just plain wrong.”); Jones v. Allen, 483 F. Supp. 2d 
1142, 1149 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (“[B]ecause the execution itself is the event [the plaintiff] claims 
would violate his constitutional rights, it defies logic, and is contrary to the common law of torts, 
to conclude that the statute of limitations has already run on a suit to prevent an 
unconstitutional act that has not yet occurred.”). 
 207. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Farmer, 865 F. Supp. 1143, 1152 (E.D. Pa. 1994) 
(“[One] policy [underlying statutes of limitations] is grounded in judicial economy . . . .”). 
 208. Id. (quoting Anthony v. Koppers Co., 425 A.2d 428, 441 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980)). 
 209. See, e.g., McNair, 515 F.3d at 1174 (holding that the statute of limitations begins 
running on “the later of the date on which state review is complete, or the date on which the 
capital litigant becomes subject to a new or substantially changed execution protocol”). 
 210. See Fields, supra note 187 (“In the backup procedure, workers will inject the lethal 
drugs directly into a muscle—another practice that is not done anywhere else in the 
country . . . .”); Urbina, supra note 37 (“Ohio [said] it would switch to a single drug, rather than 
a three-drug cocktail, in its death penalty procedure.”). 
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framework determines when or how such changes may occur.”211 Yet 
presumably such drastic changes in procedures would restart the 
statute-of-limitations clock for all death row inmates in Ohio, 
regardless of whether they had already filed suit and had their 
challenges dismissed for failure to comply with the statute of 
limitations.212 
It is also concerning that the Cooey approach requires death row 
inmates to file method-of-execution challenges so early in the 
appellate and postconviction process. It is true that the prudent 
prisoner today might, under some circumstances, file a lethal-
injection challenge during, rather than at the completion of, his 
federal habeas proceedings, to avoid dismissal of his lawsuit on 
equitable grounds.213 Under Cooey, however, the challenge must be 
filed within approximately two years of the completion of direct 
review,214 when most death row inmates are at the very beginning of 
their state postconviction proceedings and potentially decades away 
from execution. Given the high rate of reversals in both state and 
federal postconviction proceedings,215 it is likely that an inmate could 
file a § 1983 action challenging lethal injection, win relief and a new 
trial in state postconviction proceedings, get sentenced to death again 
in a retrial, and then have to file another § 1983 challenge at the 
conclusion of his second direct appeal process. In the meantime, the 
lethal-injection procedures and personnel in the jurisdiction would 
likely have changed in constitutionally meaningful ways. 
 
 211. Cooey II, 479 F.3d at 427 (Gilman, J., dissenting). 
 212. It is important to note, however, that although major changes to the written protocol—
such as the substitution of a three-drug protocol for a one-drug protocol—would likely restart 
the statute-of-limitations clock under Cooey, courts have thus far interpreted narrowly the 
exception in Cooey for changed procedures. In Cooey itself, the Sixth Circuit rejected the notion 
that the 2006 changes made to the Ohio protocol following the botched execution of Joseph 
Clark were sufficient to restart the clock, even though they addressed many fundamental 
aspects of the execution procedures. Id. at 424. Subsequent district courts in Ohio have thus 
been constrained, if somewhat reluctantly, to hold that the 2006 changes were not sufficiently 
significant. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Strickland, No. 2:08-cv-442, 2008 WL 4115836, at *1 (S.D. Ohio 
Aug. 28, 2008) (noting that the court might be inclined to agree with the petitioner that the 
statute of limitations should be restarted based on the 2006 changes but that “[i]t is not the 
province of this Court to reject” the Sixth Circuit’s “notably sweeping conclusion” to the 
contrary); see also Wilson v. Rees, No. 09-6306, 2010 WL 3450078, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 3, 2010) 
(rejecting a Kentucky death row inmate’s claim that changes to the lethal-injection protocol in 
that state restarted the statute-of-limitations clock under Cooey). 
 213. See supra text accompanying notes 165–67. 
 214. See supra Part I.A. 
 215. See supra text accompanying note 148. 
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It was with an eye toward avoiding this wasteful and inefficient 
litigation that the Supreme Court held in Stewart v. Martinez-
Villareal216 that a death row inmate’s claim of incompetency to be 
executed is not ripe until his execution is imminent.217 There are other 
parallels with Martinez-Villareal as well. Just as an inmate’s 
competence can wax, wane, and deteriorate significantly during the 
years between sentencing and execution, the administration of an 
execution protocol can change substantially during the many years 
from direct appeal to execution. Just as there can be times when the 
condemned inmate is competent and times when he is not, there 
could be periods when an execution process is constitutional and 
periods when it is not.218 
In Panetti v. Quarterman,219 the Supreme Court elaborated on the 
havoc it would wreak if death row inmates were required to raise 
incompetency-to-be-executed claims well before their scheduled 
executions: 
“[T]he implications . . . would be far reaching and seemingly 
perverse.” A prisoner would be faced with two options: forgo the 
opportunity to raise a[n incompetency] claim in federal court; or 
raise the claim in a first federal habeas application . . . even though it 
is premature. . . . All prisoners are at risk of deteriorations in their 
mental state. As a result, conscientious defense attorneys would be 
obliged to file unripe (and, in many cases, meritless) [incompetency] 
claims in each and every [habeas] application. This counterintuitive 
approach would add to the burden imposed on courts, applicants, 
and the States, with no clear advantage to any.220 
Although the precise procedural considerations are somewhat 
different in the method-of-execution context, the Court’s 
apprehensions in Panetti are directly analogous. Given the concerns 
one sees, particularly in the death penalty context, about judicial 
 
 216. Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998). 
 217. Id. at 643. 
 218. For example, if a state is using recently expired drugs, or has obtained execution drugs 
from an unauthorized source, its plan to implement the written protocol may be constitutionally 
infirm. See supra text accompanying notes 47–53. This is not to say that it is impossible to 
conceive of a lethal-injection challenge that is ripe several years prior to the scheduled 
execution date. But again, the ripeness of the claim does not, and should not, dictate when it 
accrues. See infra Part IV. 
 219. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007). 
 220. Id. at 943 (quoting Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. at 644). 
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economy and discouraging frivolous litigation,221 it is counterintuitive 
to set a rule that gives plaintiffs the incentive—and perhaps even the 
mandate—to file method-of-execution challenges so early. 
3. Fostering Uncertainty and Confusion.  Another purpose of a 
statute of limitations is the certainty it fosters, particularly for 
defendants.222 The Cooey approach has the illusion of certainty, but 
only that. It is true that the date upon which the inmate’s direct 
review is completed is easily identifiable. Yet the Cooey approach 
generally contains an exception for plaintiffs who did not have facts 
about the state’s written protocol that were necessary to litigate their 
claims.223 This could be a narrow loophole or an enormous one, 
depending on how realistically courts view the nature of a lethal-
injection challenge. Courts have thus far interpreted this loophole 
quite narrowly, and, even on its face, it applies only to changes in the 
written protocol.224 For the most part, courts have held that the state’s 
choice of lethal injection as a method of execution (or perhaps the 
release of the protocol) is sufficient to start the statute-of-limitations 
clock running.225 But the reality is that protocols are ever-changing in 
the current litigation climate, and it is likely that the same inmates’ 
accrual date will start over depending on how significantly a state 
changes its lethal-injection protocol. 
A challenge to lethal injection in Pennsylvania illustrates how 
difficult it can be to determine when the statute of limitations should 
accrue in situations in which it is unclear when the plaintiffs had 
access to the information about the protocol needed to file a § 1983 
lawsuit. In Chester v. Beard,226 the court agreed with the state that the 
statute of limitations applied but concluded that there was no 
 
 221. See supra text accompanying note 83. 
 222. See Adam Bain & Ugo Colella, Interpreting Federal Statutes of Limitations, 37 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 493, 498 (2004) (“[I]t is . . . ‘unfair’ to disregard the principle of repose, 
which provides defendants certainty that potential claims—whose adjudication may be 
materially hampered by the passage of time—will expire on a date certain.”). 
 223. See supra text accompanying note 79. 
 224. See supra text accompanying notes 209–12. 
 225. See, e.g., Walker v. Epps, 550 F.3d 407, 414 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[Section] 1983 method-of-
execution actions . . . necessarily accrue on the later of two dates: the date direct review of an 
individual case is complete or the date on which the challenged protocol was adopted.”); Cooey 
v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 422 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Ohio did not adopt lethal injection 
until 1993, or make it the exclusive method of execution until 2001, so the accrual date must be 
adjusted because Cooey obviously could not have discovered the ‘injury’ until one of those two 
dates.”). 
 226. Chester v. Beard, 657 F. Supp. 2d 534 (M.D. Pa. 2009). 
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immediately apparent accrual date that should serve to bar the 
action.227 In that case, the state alleged that the plaintiffs had sufficient 
information about the lethal-injection procedures as a result of a 
letter that the state’s counsel had sent to counsel for the public 
defender’s office some years earlier.228 The court held, however, that it 
was impossible to determine which of the plaintiffs had seen the 
letter, when they may have seen it, or whether the information in the 
letter was sufficient to put them on notice of the potential 
constitutional problems with the administration of the protocol.229 
Making matters worse, state officials “candidly acknowledged that 
they carefully guard against public dissemination of information 
regarding the Commonwealth’s death-penalty protocol, and this fact 
makes it further difficult to determine an accrual date.”230 
Chester raises familiar and likely recurring problems in this 
context. What if the protocol is made available to some inmates under 
seal, but is not available at all to other inmates?231 What if the 
protocol is adopted but kept a secret? What if the protocol is released 
publicly, but the details—such as the qualifications of the personnel 
tasked with administering the protocol—are not?232 These questions 
demonstrate that there is nothing certain about the Cooey approach 
to an accrual date. This uncertainty undermines the central principle 
of repose, a principle “which provides defendants certainty that 
potential claims—whose adjudication may be materially hampered by 
the passage of time—will expire on a date certain.”233 
 
 227. Id. at 540–41. 
 228. Id. at 538–39. 
 229. Id. at 540–41 n.4. 
 230. Id. at 541. 
 231. It is not uncommon for the details of a state’s lethal-injection protocol to be made 
available only to counsel for death row inmates who are parties to pending litigation. See, e.g., 
Pamela Manson, Killer to Get Info on Execution Means, SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 6, 2010, at B1 
(noting a court’s decision to allow counsel for Utah death row inmate Ronnie Lee Gardner 
access to information about Utah’s execution methods on the condition that counsel would not 
“show the documents to [Gardner] or other inmates”). In some cases, such as litigation 
currently pending regarding the federal government’s lethal-injection procedures, all of the 
relevant documents are under seal, and only six federal death row inmates are party to the 
litigation and therefore privy to the information. 
 232. See Berger, supra note 10, at 277 (noting “states’ efforts to conceal the details” of their 
lethal-injection procedures). It has been a battle for death row inmates in many states to learn 
the qualifications of the execution team members who will be implementing the written 
protocol. See, e.g., Emergency Motion for Stay of Execution Under Circuit Rule 27-3, Brown v. 
Vail, No. 10-35771 (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 2010) (describing the efforts of petitioner’s counsel to 
obtain information about the qualifications of execution team members in Washington). 
 233. Bain & Colella, supra note 222, at 498. 
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*          *          * 
Parts II and III of this Article have demonstrated that, when 
equitable concerns are conflated with statute-of-limitations concerns, 
the result is an arbitrary and unfair rule that does not achieve its 
intended purpose. The question remains: is there a better way? 
Where should the accrual date be set if not at some point along the 
appellate timeline? Part IV suggests that the question itself wrongly 
assumes a predicate that may not exist; specifically, when the 
constitutional injury has not yet occurred, there ought not be any 
accrual date prior to the execution itself. 
IV.  NO FUNCTIONAL ACCRUAL DATE 
There is a reason why any attempt to choose an accrual date 
prior to the execution has an air of arbitrariness to it. Courts that do 
so are trying to fix a date at which point a tort has been committed, 
when the injury has not yet—and, indeed, may never—occur. This is 
why the best approach is the one Judge Thompson proposed in Jones: 
the accrual date, if it ever occurs, occurs on the date of the 
unconstitutional execution.234 Because the execution results in the 
prospective plaintiff’s death, there is no functional accrual date under 
this approach. 
Citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts,235 Judge Thompson 
pointed out that “the statute [of limitations] does not usually begin to 
run until the tort is complete.”236 In method-of-execution challenges, 
the tort is not complete until the plaintiff is executed. Thus, the 
statute-of-limitations clock should not start until the execution has 
occurred. Moreover, as discussed previously, the historical and policy 
reasons behind the statute-of-limitations defense, if anything, support 
an accrual date that coincides with the execution itself. In general, 
“the farther away in time from the tortious act, the staler the claim 
and the greater the defendants’ interest in a statute of limitations 
barring it.”237 It thus defies common sense, as Judge Thompson 
 
 234. Jones v. Allen, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1148 (M.D. Ala. 2007). Judge Thompson is not the 
only one to suggest this approach. The district court judge in Cooey did so as well. See Cooey v. 
Strickland (Cooey I), No. 2:04 CV 1156, 2005 WL 5253337, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 28, 2005). 
 235. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965). 
 236. Jones, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 1148 (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 cmt. c) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 237. Id. at 1150. 
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explained, to urge that “the statute of limitations take effect as we 
move closer in time to the complained-of act.”238 
Consider, for example, a § 1983 lawsuit filed by the family of an 
executed prisoner for the pain and suffering he experienced as a 
result of a botched execution. The natural accrual date for such an 
action would be the date of the botched execution, and not a moment 
before. Indeed, when the family of Joseph Clark initiated such an 
action in Ohio soon after Clark’s botched execution, the statute of 
limitations was never even raised as a defense by the lawyers in the 
Ohio Attorney General’s Office who defended against the suit.239 
Yet in the lethal-injection context, states’ lawyers now routinely 
cite the adoption by Cooey and its progeny of an approach that bars 
claims long before the violation even occurs, let alone grows stale. 
The primary justification for the circuit courts’ rejection of Judge 
Thompson’s approach is that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Wallace v. Kato240 precludes a no-accrual-date standard.241 
In Wallace, the petitioner had filed a § 1983 lawsuit against the 
City of Chicago and several Chicago police officers seeking damages 
for an unlawful arrest and false imprisonment that had led to his 
wrongful conviction and sentence for first-degree murder.242 The 
question for the Court was when the § 1983 statute of limitations 
accrued.243 The Court noted that, typically, accrual occurs when the 
plaintiff has “a complete and present cause of action, that is, when the 
plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.”244 When the tort at issue is 
false imprisonment, however, the Court noted that there has to be 
some accommodation for the fact that the “victim may not be able to 
sue while he is still imprisoned.”245 Thus, the Court pinned the accrual 
date to the date upon which the false imprisonment ended—that is, 
when legal process was initiated.246 
Cooey and its progeny rely to a great extent on Wallace to rule 
out an accrual date that coincides with the execution. These courts 
 
 238. Id. 
 239. See, e.g., Clark v. Voorhies, No. 1:07-cv-00510 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 28, 2010). 
 240. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007). 
 241. See, e.g., Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 416 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing 
accrual under principles “the Supreme Court recently made clear” in Wallace). 
 242. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 386–87. 
 243. Id. at 387. 
 244. Id. at 388 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 245. Id. at 389. 
 246. Id. at 390. 
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point to the language in Wallace to the effect that accrual occurs when 
the plaintiff “can file suit and obtain relief.”247 As the Eleventh Circuit 
put it in McNair, “it is difficult to reconcile Wallace with the [lower 
court’s] holding that the limitations period would not begin to run 
until after the litigant has died.”248 The theory of these courts is that, 
pursuant to the language of Wallace, a death row inmate could file 
suit (as several have) and obtain relief prior to the execution itself. 
So, it cannot be that the claim has not yet accrued. 
But Wallace does not inexorably lead to the conclusion in Cooey. 
As Judge Thompson explained in Jones, Wallace was, in many ways, a 
typical § 1983 suit in which the plaintiff filed suit after the tort had 
occurred.249 Because the method-of-execution challenge seeks to 
prevent an allegedly unconstitutional act from occurring in the future, 
the language in Wallace that Cooey and its progeny rely upon is of 
limited significance.250 Judge Thompson went on to say, however, that 
Wallace should not be ignored. In fact, Wallace teaches that “[a]spects 
of § 1983 [that] are not governed by reference to state law are 
governed by federal rules conforming in general to common-law tort 
principles,” and that those principles provide that the statute of 
limitations does not begin to run until the tort is “complete.”251 
Judge Thompson was right. But Wallace supports the no-accrual-
date approach even more than he acknowledges. First, Wallace 
discusses the “standard rule” for determining the accrual date but 
explicitly states that there is a “refinement to be considered” when 
the tort at issue is “distinctive.”252 In other words, the general 
approach cited talismanically by the Cooey line of cases—that accrual 
occurs when the plaintiff can “file suit and obtain relief”—is just that: 
a general rule, subject to refinement and exception when the tort 
involved is not a typical tort. 
Even more importantly, Wallace also demonstrates that nothing 
prevents a plaintiff from suing before a claim accrues for statute-of-
limitations purposes. Such an event struck both the Sixth and 
Eleventh Circuits as an impossibility, and this was the basis for their 
 
 247. See, e.g., McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1174 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Wallace, 549 
U.S. at 388); Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 416 (6th Cir. 2007) (same); Roane v. 
Holder, 607 F. Supp. 2d 216, 221 (D.D.C. 2009) (same). 
 248. McNair, 515 F.3d at 1174. 
 249. Jones v. Allen, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1147 (M.D. Ala. 2007). 
 250. Id. at 1147–48. 
 251. Id. at 1148. 
 252. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388. 
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objection to the no-accrual-date approach. In McNair, the Eleventh 
Circuit indicated that it believed that setting the accrual date at the 
completion of direct review precluded a lawsuit from being filed 
earlier.253 In Cooey, the Sixth Circuit rejected the suggestion to set the 
accrual date at the point where actual harm is inflicted “because the 
death-sentenced inmate’s claim would not accrue until he was 
executed, at which time it would also be simultaneously moot.”254 
These courts are confusing ripeness with accrual. As Wallace actually 
clarifies, a claim can be ripe without having accrued. Wallace 
explicitly recognized that the plaintiff in that case could have sued 
before his statute of limitations accrued.255 
The distinction between ripeness and accrual is important not 
only because it calls into question the fundamental underpinning of 
the Cooey court’s discomfort with the no-accrual-date approach, but 
also because it highlights the fallacy of any accrual date that is tied to 
an inmate’s appeal or postconviction proceedings. Even the approach 
favored by the dissenters, which would set the accrual date at the 
completion of federal habeas proceedings, betrays a 
misunderstanding of the distinction between ripeness and accrual. 
After all, it may be risky for any death row inmate to wait until the 
completion of federal habeas proceedings to file a claim, even if the 
governing law in his jurisdiction stated that his claim did not accrue 
until that point in time.256 Yet the approach of the dissenters implies 
that inmates must wait until federal habeas proceedings are over 
before filing suit. 
A method-of-execution challenge is ripe when the prospective 
plaintiff has all of the facts necessary to file a claim. That is, when the 
plaintiff can file suit.257 The selection of an accrual date should address 
the purposes of statutes of limitations. That is, when the plaintiff must 
file suit. Method-of-execution challenges are analogous to 
“continuing violation” cases in which an unlawful practice continues 
 
 253. McNair, 515 F.3d at 1176; see also Roane v. Holder, 607 F. Supp. 2d 216, 221–22 
(D.D.C. 2009) (implying that a challenge cannot be filed prior to the accrual date set by the 
court). 
 254. Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 418 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 255. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 390 n.3 (“This is not to say, of course, that petitioner could not 
have filed suit immediately upon his false arrest.”). 
 256. See supra text accompanying notes 165–67. 
 257. See, e.g., David Floren, Comment, Pre-Enforcement Ripeness Doctrine: The Fitness of 
Hardship, 80 OR. L. REV. 1107, 1109 (2001) (“For issues raised in the controversy to be fit for 
resolution by the court, they should be largely legal in nature and should not require further 
factual development.”). 
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into the limitations period.258 In those cases, the Supreme Court has 
said, “the staleness concern disappears,” and the statute of limitations 
begins running only when the “last asserted occurrence” of the 
allegedly illegal practice takes place.259 In a method-of-execution 
challenge, the “last asserted occurrence” of the continuing violation is 
the execution itself. The Cooey approach is wrong not only because 
the analogy to AEDPA is faulty, but also because any attempt to tie 
accrual to what is essentially an unrelated proceeding—the appeals 
and postconviction process—divorces the inquiry from the principles 
that underlie statutes of limitations. 
The no-accrual-date approach is not perfect. For example, 
because it allows method-of-execution challenges to be brought 
whenever new relevant facts come to light, it does not guarantee the 
certainty that is one of the purposes of statutes of limitations. The 
response to this concern is twofold. First, the Cooey approach also 
fosters little certainty, and it may be that so long as method-of-
execution claims are cognizable under the Eighth Amendment, it is 
impossible to draw clear, bright lines with respect to when claims can 
and cannot be brought.260 Second, there should be little worry that the 
no-accrual-date approach will open the doors to a flood of last-minute 
method-of-execution claims, or that such an approach will stifle 
innovation in the development of execution procedures. After all, 
prior to the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Cooey in 2007, the statute of 
limitations was never an issue in these cases, and the courts proved 
themselves quite capable of distinguishing meritorious and timely 
filed claims from frivolous and dilatory ones. 
Another potential argument against the no-accrual-date 
approach, not yet articulated by any court, is that the tort being 
committed is not the execution itself, but the imposition of the risk 
that the tort will be committed. In Baze, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that “[o]ur cases recognize that subjecting individuals 
to a risk of future harm—not simply actually inflicting pain—can 
qualify as cruel and unusual punishment.”261 Helling v. McKinney262 
 
 258. See supra text accompanying note 155. 
 259. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380–81 (1981). Method-of-execution 
challenges may also be loosely analogized to the tort claim of medical monitoring, which has 
also raised vexing procedural issues, including ones related to statute-of-limitations accrual. 
Pankaj Venugopal, Note, The Class Certification of Medical Monitoring Claims, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1659, 1675–76 (2002). 
 260. See discussion supra Part II.B.3. 
 261. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1530 (2008) (plurality opinion). 
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and Farmer v. Brennan263 explain what level of risk qualifies to 
establish an Eighth Amendment violation, but neither case addressed 
the question of when a lawsuit filed under the Eighth Amendment 
would accrue for statute-of-limitations purposes.264 One might argue, 
however, that if the risk is the constitutional violation, why not set the 
accrual date at the point where the risk rises to the level of a 
constitutional violation? 
The answer is that, although Helling and Farmer explain that an 
Eighth Amendment violation can be proven by establishing the level 
of risk, it is not the risk itself that constitutes the tort—only the 
torturous execution can actually inflict constitutional injury upon the 
plaintiff. Judge Thompson wrote in Jones that “[k]nowledge of a 
needless risk of a painful death at the hands of the State does not 
itself violate the Constitution; only the execution itself would.”265 Can 
that language be squared with the language in Baze suggesting that 
subjecting individuals to the risk of pain “can qualify as cruel and 
unusual punishment”?266 Yes, if one understands that the showing of 
risk in these contexts is necessary because the case involves a future 
harm;267 the litigation aims to prevent the harm from happening, so 
the risk is a stand-in for the actual injury. In other words, the claim is 
ripe when the plaintiff can show the substantial risk, but it does not 
accrue until the harm is actually inflicted.268 
Moreover, an approach to accrual that started the statute-of-
limitations clock at the point at which the risk became “substantial” 
would lead to a hopelessly confusing and inefficient set of 
considerations. Courts would have to engage in bizarre mental 
gymnastics to determine not whether the state’s procedures violated 
 
 262. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993). 
 263. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). 
 264. In a footnote, the Farmer Court stated, “At what point a risk of inmate assault becomes 
sufficiently substantial for Eighth Amendment purposes is a question this case does not present, 
and we do not address it.” Id. at 834 n.3. 
 265. Jones v. Allen, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149 (M.D. Ala. 2007). 
 266. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1530. 
 267. See Helling, 509 U.S. at 33 (“That the Eighth Amendment protects against future harm 
to inmates is not a novel proposition.”). 
 268. It is also important to point out that the statute of limitations was not before the Court 
in Baze. In fact, the Court’s language was intended to deal with a very different problem: the 
ability of a death row inmate to sue prior to the infliction of the harm. In other words, the Court 
was implicitly addressing the ripeness issue, assuring plaintiffs that its precedent did not 
preclude a civil lawsuit to enjoin a future harm. Nothing in the Baze decision can otherwise be 
read to suggest that the Court believed a method-of-execution claim accrued at the moment the 
harm became substantial enough to justify a constitutional intervention. 
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the Baze standard, but, as a threshold matter, when exactly (to the 
day) the risk of harm crossed the line into “substantial” territory such 
that the statute of limitations began running. The impossibility of 
such a task may explain why no court has suggested such an 
approach. 
Because the event the litigation seeks to avoid—the torturous 
execution—is an event with a fixed time, it is easier and more sensible 
to attach accrual there. This approach is the best answer doctrinally 
and also avoids the arbitrary and confusing line drawing of Cooey. It 
is also more faithful to the principles of statutes of limitations than is 
the approach championed by the Cooey dissenters. It provides a 
realistic opportunity for a day in court for death row inmates with 
meritorious claims, and, more than any other approach, it takes into 
account the realities of most method-of-execution challenges filed in 
today’s capital punishment regime. 
CONCLUSION 
One does not have to guess at the motivations behind Cooey and 
its progeny. The Eleventh Circuit in McNair worried about giving 
death row inmates “veto power” over the state’s ability to enforce its 
judgments.269 The Sixth Circuit in Cooey was concerned about 
weakening the states’ ability to “exercise [their] sovereign power and 
to finalize [their] judgments.”270 It is a familiar concern: that death row 
inmates and their attorneys are forever cooking up novel challenges 
to delay the inevitable.271 But what makes the Cooey approach truly 
puzzling is that it is simply not necessary in order to address the 
stated concern about dilatory lawsuits, and the havoc the Cooey 
approach wreaks on the doctrine is not insubstantial. 
As this Article demonstrates, courts’ equitable power to 
determine whether a stay is appropriate is more than sufficient to 
weed out method-of-execution lawsuits that are deemed to be 
dilatory. Whatever one thinks of the appropriate accrual date in this 
context, the use of the statute of limitations to punish death row 
inmates for filing late § 1983 lawsuits has spawned a rule that has no 
upside. It does not provide certainty, it does not provide access to the 
courts to those who are legitimately entitled, and it bears little 
 
 269. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 270. Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 419 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 271. See supra note 83. 
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resemblance to the historical justifications for statutes of limitations. 
Yet it is currently the law of the land in the most active death penalty 
states. 
In McNair, the Eleventh Circuit listed three benefits of using 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations in the method-of-execution context.272 
This Article has rejected the first two—to preclude claims from being 
filed too early273 or too late274—as plausible bases for adopting the 
AEDPA statute of limitations. The court suggested a third, additional 
benefit: that, by mirroring the AEDPA statute of limitations, the 
method-of-execution statute of limitations “thereby simplif[ies] the 
postconviction labyrinth of filing deadlines through which capital 
litigants must navigate.”275 This view is either naïve or deliberately 
disingenuous. Nothing about the Cooey approach simplifies filing 
deadlines for death row inmates. 
To the contrary, the Cooey approach renders it virtually 
impossible for many death row inmates to pursue litigation 
challenging the method of execution. As one Sixth Circuit judge 
noted, “Determining when the statute of limitations begins to run for 
a death-sentenced prisoner who wishes to challenge a state’s method 
of execution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is tantamount to determining 
whether the prisoner will be able to challenge the method of 
execution at all.”276 
Recent challenges to lethal-injection procedures have exposed 
grave problems with the administration of that particular method of 
execution in many states.277 This litigation has delayed a number of 
executions, but it has also resulted in more humane executions in 
some states278 and at least a continued judicial vigilance in many 
others.279 The no-accrual-date approach advocated here acknowledges 
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that the injury is a torturous execution, and that if the statute of 
limitations should run at all in such a case, it should run from the day 
the harm is inflicted. Successful inmates will file their lawsuits long 
before that moment, when their claims ripen. Inmates like Romell 
Broom in Ohio will be able to get their day in court and prevent the 
infliction of serious constitutional injury before it occurs. 
Cooey and its progeny represent a series of court decisions that 
distort settled doctrine to solve a problem that does not exist. It is not 
immediately clear what that phenomenon tells us about courts and 
their treatment of issues that are at the intersection of criminal and 
civil law. What is clear is that courts wrestling with the proper accrual 
date for a method-of-execution challenge would do well to reconsider 
the Cooey approach in favor of one that is more faithful to the 
purposes of statutes of limitations, more practical, and no less 
consistent with a desire to preclude dilatory lawsuits. 
 
